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INTRODUCTION

The organizing theme of this Symposium is whether and how Congress might
respond to the recent reign of the "Federalism Five." Over the past eight years, the
Supreme Court has been unusually aggressive in its exercise ofjudicial review over
federal statutes challenged on federalism grounds. Eleven times the Court has
invalidated provisions in federal statutes after determining that Congress exceeded the
scope of its limited regulatory authority. In ten of the eleven cases, the vote was 5-4
with the identical five-Justice conservative majority (Chief Justice Rehnquist and
Justices O'Connor, Scalia, Kennedy, and Thomas) controlling the decision.

t Copyright 2002 Evan Caminker. All rights reserved.
* Professor of Law and Associate Dean of Academic Affairs, University of Michigan Law
School; B.A. 1983, UCLA; J.D. 1986, Yale University. I wish to thank Dawn Johnsen, Charlie
Geyh, and Lauren Robel for putting together this wonderful Symposium, and all of the
participants for such an interesting and insightful two-day conversation about federalism and
much more. I also wish specifically to thank Mitch Berman, Barry Friedman, Jed Shugerman,
and Mark Tushnet for providing helpful comments on an earlier draft, and Coulter Boeschen,
Ryan Junck, and several reference librarians of the Michigan Law School Library for helpful

research assistance.
1. The list of 5-4 invalidations includes: Fed. Mar. Comm'n v. S.C. State Ports Auth., 122 S.
Ct. 1864 (2002) (invalidating statutory scheme providing for adjudication of private complaints
against states through federal administrative agency procedures as violating state sovereign
immunity), Bd. of Trs. of Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356 (2001) (holding disability
discrimination statute beyond Congress's Section 5 enforcement power); United States v.
Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000) (invalidating portion of Violence Against Women Act as beyond
Congress's Commerce Clause or Section 5 enforcement powers); Kimel v. Fla. Bd. of Regents,
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This recent burst of decisions invalidating federal statutory provisions, particularly
by bare-majority rule, is historically anomalous. During the first 207 years following
constitutional ratification, the Supreme Court invalidated provisions of federal statutes
in 135 cases; 25 times by a bare majority of Justices. During the past eight years, from
1995 to 2002, the Court has invalidated provisions of federal statutes in 33 cases (or
19.6% of the total in 3.7% of the time), and split 5-4 in sixteen of these cases (39% of
the total in 3.7% of the time).2 Of course, the total quantity of federal statutory
enactments has increased over time, and some would suggest that in recent years
Congress elicited this judicial response by becoming less respectful of constitutional
boundaries.
But at least in the federalism context, surely a large part of the story is the Supreme
Court's de facto withdrawal of the supposed "presumption of constitutionality"
afforded federal statutes, according to which the Court should "invalidate a
congressional enactment only upon a plain showing that Congress has exceeded its
constitutional bounds."3 Justice Scalia has recently said as much,4 and many scholars

528 U.S. 62 (2000) (holding age discrimination statute beyond Congress's Section 5
enforcement power); Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706 (1999) (invalidating statutory provision
purporting to abrogate state sovereign immunity in state courts); Coll. Sav. Bank v. Fla. Prepaid
Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd., 527 U.S. 666 (1999) (invalidating statutory provision
purporting to abrogate state sovereign immunity); Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd.
v. Coll. Sav. Bank, 527 U.S. 627 (1999) (holding patent statute beyond Congress's Section 5
enforcement power); Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44 (1996) (invalidating
statutory provision purporting to abrogate state sovereign immunity); Printz v. United States,
521 U.S. 898 (1997) (invalidating provision in gun purchase statute that commandeered
state/local officials to implement federal program); United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995)
(invalidating gun possession statute as beyond Congress's Commerce Clause power); see also
City of Boeme v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997) (holding religious discrimination statute beyond
Congress's Section 5 enforcement powers) (6-3 invalidation).
2. These figures are based in large part on the data provided by the Library of Congress, see
Acts of Cong. Held Unconstitutional in Whole or Part by the Supreme Court of the United

States, [The Constitution of the United States of America-Analysis and Interpretation] Cong.
Research Serv. (Gov't Printing Office) 1999, 2001-31 (Johnny H. Killian & George A. Costello
eds., 1992) and 151-58 (Supp. 2000). 1added an additional handful of cases decided prior to the
year 2000 that in my judgment should have been included, and I also added the eight cases
invalidating provisions in federal statutes (four of them 5-4 decisions) in the 2000 and 2001
Supreme Court Terms. There have also been four cases in which a provision of a congressional
enactment was invalidated on a 5-3 vote, with one Justice not participating; I do not count here
any of those as bare-majority opinions, though it is reasonably clear in some of these cases that
the vote would have been 5-4 had the full Court participated.
As a general matter, the increased frequency of 5-4 decisions over time is not limited to cases
involving constitutional challenges to federal statutes, see Robert E. Riggs, When Every Vote
Counts: 5-4 Decisionsin the United States Supreme Court, 1900-90, 21 HOFSTRA L. REv. 667,
668-74 (1993) (documenting general rise in 5-4 decisions from beginning to near-end of last
century), though the increase in 5-4 decisions in this particular category of cases over the past
eight years appears to outstrip significantly the general pace.
3. Morrison, 529 U.S. at 607.
4. See A Shot from Justice Scalia, WASH. POST, May 2, 2000, at A22 (quoting speech by
Justice Scalia questioning whether the "presumption [of constitutionality] is unwarranted" given
that Congress is "increasingly abdicating its independent responsibility to be sure that it is being
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agree that "[t]he Court, or rather five of its members banded together, has
systematically been cutting back on the degree of deference due Congress in
implementing its powers." 5 If actions speak louder than words, it appears that the
Court's continuing recitation of a presumption of constitutionality afforded
congressional enactments has become mere sport.
Scholars have recently been focusing on ways in which Congress might either work
within the new doctrinal constraints the Court has articulated,6 or circumvent those
constraints entirely. 7 However, the last time a conservative Supreme Court issued a
similar spate of largely bare-majority decisions invalidating federal statutes on
federalism grounds, which was during the Progressive Era, 8 would-be reformers
proposed a far more direct route to blunting the Court's aggression. Led by Senator
William E. Borah of Idaho, the progressives championed (among other proposals) the
notion that Congress should require supermajority rather than bare-majority agreement
among the Justices before the Supreme Court could invalidate a federal statute. 9 Borah
believed that the fact that a decision invalidating a federal statute was 5-4 or even 6-3
belied the notion that the presumption of constitutionality had justifiably been
overcome by a clear error, and that congressional imposition of a supermajority
requirement was the best way of returning teeth to the presumption.

faithful to the Constitution .... (Speech at the Michigan State University Telecommunications
Law and Policy Symposium (Apr. 18, 2000))).
5. See Larry D. Kramer, The Supreme Court 2000 Term: Foreword. We the Court, 115
HARV. L. REV. 4, 151 (2001); accordA. Christopher Bryant &Timothy J. Simeone, Remanding
to Congress: The Supreme Court's New "On the Record" ConstitutionalReview of Federal
Statutes, 86 CORNELL L. REv. 328 (2001); William W. Buzbee & Robert A. Schapiro,
Legislative Record Review, 54 STAN. L. REv. 87 (2001); Ruth Colker & James J. Brudney,

Dissing Congress, 100 MICH. L. REv. 80 (2001).
6. Such responses include, for example, creating better factual records documenting the need
for federal intervention, being clearer about intentions to regulate states or realms of traditional
state governance so as to satisfy the Court's "clear statement requirements," and better tailoring
legislative means to permissible ends.
7. See, e.g., Lynn A. Baker & Mitchell N. Berman, Getting Off the Dole: Why the Court
ShouldAbandon Its Spending Doctrine,and How a Too-Clever Congress CouldProvoke It to
Do So, 78 IND. L.J. 459 (2003) (discussing the promises and pitfalls of congressional resort to

conditional spending to circumvent new federalism constraints on other Article I powers).
8. For a rich historical discussion of this period and phenomenon, see generally WILLIAM G.
Ross, A MUTED FURY (1994).
9. While others supported different measures designed to counter the Court's conservative
activism, for example, Senator Robert LaFollette's proposal to enable Congress to reenact any
statute invalidated by the Supreme Court, id.at 193-217, Senator Borah led an effort to impose a
supermajority rule on the Court, id. at 218-32. Specifically, he introduced and supported a
legislative proposal to require the concurrence of seven Justices in order for the Court to
invalidate a federal statute. S. 4483, 107th Cong. (1923).
That in all suits now pending, or which may hereafter be pending, in the Supreme
Court of the United States, except cases affecting ambassadors, other public
ministers, and consuls and those in which a State shall be a party, where is drawn
in question an Act of Congress on the ground of repugnancy to the Constitution of
the United States, at least seven members of the court concur before pronouncing
said law unconstitutional.
Id. Other supermajority proposals were introduced in early 1923 as well, see infra app. at 119.
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In keeping with the theme of this Symposium, one could imagine such. a
congressional response today to the "Federalism Five's" agenda: Congress
theoretically might require supermajority consensus for the Court to invalidate a
federal statute on federalism grounds. Given the apparent rigidity of the 5-4 split
among the Justices regarding basic principles and doctrines of federalism, such a
supermajority rule would most likely bring to an immediate halt the recent wave of
state-protective decisions.' 0
Of course, the first reaction to this suggestion on the part of many, if not all, readers
will likely be: "Today's Congress would never impose such a supermajority rule by
statute, both because it would not clearly serve the political interests of many
legislators, and because Congress would be wary of appearing to transgress
longstanding political norms ofjudicial independence." I agree with this assessment,
defended ably by other contributors to this Symposium." The second reaction of
many, if not all, readers will likely be: "Such a congressional statute would itself be an
unconstitutional regulation of the Supreme Court's decisionmaking process." This
claim may also ultimately be correct, though the arguments are sufficiently complex
and interesting that the project of fleshing them out is best left for another time and

10. Under a straightforward supermajority protocol, the judgment of the four "erstwhile
dissenters" that a federal statute is constitutional would control the disposition of the case (the
precedential status of this minority-bloc's rationale raises interesting and difficult questions not
addressed here).
In this Article, I focus on federalism cases, given both the theme of this Symposium and the
powerful arguments for deference to congressional judgments in this particular realm of
constitutional law. Barry Friedman helpfully suggested to me that one could cabin the approach
to a subset of federalism issues for which one believes that the arguments for deference are
especially powerful (perhaps, for example, congressional enforcement measures regulating state
behavior pursuant to Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment). But one could instead or also
advocate a supermajority requirement for other specific realms of constitutional law, if one
believes that the presumption of constitutionality deserves greater bite than it currently seems to
have. Learned Hand, for example, once rejected a supermajority protocol for federalism
decisions but embraced it for Lochner-esque substantive due process challenges based on his

view that "the questions are in their nature essentially legislative" in this realm. Learned Hand,
The Legal Right to Starve, 25 NEW REPUBLIC 254, 255 (1923). More broadly, one could
advocate a supermajority protocol for invalidations of federal statutes across the board.
11 . See Charles G. Geyh, JudicialIndependence, JudicialAccountability and the Role of
ConstitutionalNorms in CongressionalRegulationof the Courts,78 IND. L.J. 153 (2003); Barry
Friedman &Anna Harvey, Electingthe Supreme Court, 78 IND. L.J. 123 (2003); see also Barry
Friedman, "Things Forgotten" in the Debate overJudicialIndependence, 14 GA. ST.U. L. REV.

737, 758-62 (1998) (tracing the rejection of various proposed means (including supermajority
rule) of controlling the judiciary during episodes of anti-Court sentiment and concluding that
"the American public ...has settled on preserving the independence of judges"). As Professor
Friedman has observed, "[tihe list [of failed proposals to control judges or courts] is long," and it
includes (among others): "impeachment, jurisdiction-stripping, court-packing, supermajority
requirements, Senate [or congressional] and popular override of Supreme Court decisions,
referenda on judges [leading to recall], and eliminating life-tenure." Id. at 758. Indeed, Isuspect
that if the federal courts themselves decided sharply to curtail the practice of judicial review,
today's Congress would likely react by encouraging or even purporting to require them to
embrace judicial review in a more full-fledged fashion.
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place. 12
However, I'd like to sidestep these two initial reactions for now, because I surmise
the third likely reaction will be: "Hey, I haven't considered that before; that's an
intriguing idea." I would agree with this as well, and believe that the notion of
requiring supermajority agreement for the Supreme Court to invalidate a federal statute
on federalism grounds is intriguing enough to warrant some exploration.
This is especially so because, while the supermajority proposition sounds quite
radical, it is far from novel. Since the 1820s, reformers periodically have championed
supermajority proposals for Supreme Court judicial review, generally alongside
proposals for stripping the Court's jurisdiction to entertain constitutional challenges at
all. To be sure, none of these federal proposals made it off the drawing board.
However, the supermajority concept has elsewhere found an actual home: two state
supreme courts currently operate under a supermajority rule governing judicial review,
and one more employed a supermajority rule for much of the twentieth century.
My goals in this Article are threefold. Most elementally, I want to bring back into
our collective scholarly consciousness a different way of thinking about potential
congressional responses to aggressive judicial review. Secondly, drawing upon the
Progressive Era debates, I want to compare two distinct methods of ensuring that the
Supreme Court accords meaningful deference to congressional determinations: (1) the
conventional atomistic approach, whereby individual Justices accord some
presumption of constitutionality as they make their own determinations as to whether
to vote to invalidate a federal statute or not; and (2) the supermajority protocol
approach, whereby the decision rule for aggregating individual votes automatically
weights the scales towards upholding federal statutes. Finally, I want to suggest that
the major criticisms levied against the supermajority proposal during the Progressive
Era can themselves highlight some uncomfortable, if less visible, aspects of our
traditional reliance on atomistic enforcement of congressional deference norms.

12. One could mount several types of challenges to congressional adoption by statute of a
supermajority rule for the Supreme Court. First, one could argue that Article III implicitly
mandates that the Supreme Court decide cases by bare-majority rule, notwithstanding silence by
the text and Framers on this issue. Second, one could argue that Congress lacks delegated
authority to prescribe voting protocols for the Supreme Court, though the Necessary and Proper
Clause seems on its face to suggest otherwise. Third, one could argue that Article III implicitly
grants the Supreme Court exclusive, or at least final, authority to determine for itself how to
decide cases, including the choice of voting procedures and protocols. Fourth, one could argue
that even if Congress could impose some voting protocols on the Supreme Court, Congress
could not impose any protocols that would sometimes dictate the outcome or rule of law
imposed in particular cases. Fifth, one could argue that this particular protocol violates
separation of powers principles because it purports to aggrandize power to Congress itself. Sixth,
one could argue that a supermajority protocol targeting constitutional challenges to federal
statutes would require that the Court essentially decide legal issues rather than (or in addition to)
deciding cases, and this would contravene the case or controversy requirement or otherwise
interfere with the proper function of an Article III court. Perhaps in recognition of these at least
plausible constitutional concerns, twelve of the fourteen federal supermajority proposals
introduced since 1968 were couched as constitutional amendments rather than statutory dictates.
See infra app. at 121-22. I consider these constitutional challenges to a congressionally dictated
supermajority rule in Evan H. Caminker, Playingwith Voting Protocolson the Supreme Court
(unpublished manuscript, draft on file with author).

INDIANA LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 78:73

I do not mean to endorse congressional imposition of a supermajority rule in this
exploratory Article, as I leave unresolved here both the optimal degree of judicial
deference and various logistical issues a supermajority rule would raise, and there is
reason to doubt that such reform would be constitutional. However, I do think the
notion is worth exploring, both to learn some lessons about the road more traveled and
3
to offer opponents of stringent judicial review an alternative avenue to consider.,

13. Barry Friedman notes that because history shows "sustained challenges to judicial
independence inevitably arise out of substantive disagreement with the content of judicial
decisions.... One ought properly to be wary of any explanation for tampering with the judiciary
that denies its political motivation, especially when popular disagreement with judicial decisions
is palpable." Friedman, supra note 11, at 755, 757. Perhaps this is so for legislative reformers,
but not for constitutional scholars, who in my experience are often disinterested in technical or
procedural constitutional questions until a politically salient event triggers the desire to answer
those questions. At that point, while many participants in the debate over process will be driven
by a preferred substantive outcome that hangs in the balance, other participants will in fact have
no such motive.
While I believe that some (though not all) of the Court's recent 5-4 federalism decisions are
unfounded, it is not because they generally support a particularly conservative social agenda.
Moreover, anyone addressing procedural issues governing judicial review must be aware that the
substantive shoe will often shift to the other foot. Cf Friedman, supra note 11, at 753-55
(challenges to independent judicial review historically have come from both the political right
and left). This is especially true inthe federalism context, as the Court's reinvigorated federalism
doctrines can constrain Congress in its pursuit of conservative as well as liberal causes. I am
drawn here to exploring supermajority rule not by some passionate commitment to reversing or
limiting the impact of the Court's recent federalism decisions, but rather by a transsubstantive
interest in enforcement mechanisms for various norms ofjudicial review.
Indeed, I am tantalized by a much larger set of questions concerning the relationship between
alternative judicial voting protocols and the Court's tendency to promote various formal and
substantive jurisprudential values. As a formal matter, the Supreme Court often decides cases via
a series of fractured opinions, without a majority-backed opinion containing a governing
rationale that can provide lower courts, public officials, and future litigants clear guidance.
Several rule of law values would be served if only the Court would instead decide cases via clear
majority-backed rules. With respect to substantive features, many scholars lament the tendency
of the Supreme Court to issue broad rather than narrow rulings that decide no more than that
which needs to be decided, or to overrule prior precedents without sufficient hesitation
counseled by the doctrine of stare decisis, or as discussed here, to invalidate federal and state
action without sufficient respect for the constitutional judgments of others. In theory, alternative
voting protocols would predictably influence the extent to which Supreme Court decisions
secured these and other formal or substantive values. With respect to formal values, for example,
the Court could decide a case only if a majority of the Justices agree to join a single opinion, in
addition to a single judgment. With respect to substantive values, the Court could make certain
kinds of decisions (for example, overruling precedents or invalidating statutes) only if a
specified supermajority of Justices agree.
To what extent might one or more of these alternative voting protocols produce better
decisionmaking, as measured by various formal and substantive criteria? What practical and
logistical difficulties might each protocol confront (for example, impact on precedential status of
Court opinions; encouragement of strategic judicial behavior)? As a matter of constitutional
authority, which if any of these alternatives could the Court adopt by itself; which if any could
Congress impose on the Court by statute; and which could be imposed on the Court only by
constitutional amendment? I intend to explore these and related questions more thoroughly in a
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I. THE ATOMISTIC NORM OF DEFERENCE TO CONGRESS

When a Supreme Court Justice interprets and applies the law to specific cases
through the process of adjudication, her judgment is informed in part by the particular
institutional role she plays in our governmental system. Of course, she will draw upon
one or more interpretive methods to discern or construct the meaning of constitutional
and statutory provisions, such as a focus on text, structure, original meaning, historical
experience, and functional purpose.14 1 call these universalmethods, for they are the
same methods that any other legal interpreter might use to interpret the Constitution or
statutes, whether he is positioned as a public official, legal scholar, or ordinary citizen.
But a Justice's interpretations will also be influenced by various role-specific norms
that dictate how a federal judge, situated on a particular multimember court within a
particular republican form of government, should decide cases. These role-specific
norms are driven by judgments about institutional competence and relations. Several
widely-shared norms involve deference: a Justice should defer somewhat to her
colleagues (so as to produce a unified opinion of the Court rather than a splintered
decision); should defer somewhat to prior judicial rulings (embracing stare decisis);
and, most relevantly for present purposes, should defer somewhat to decisions made by
democratically elected and accountable legislative bodies. In a given case, these rolespecific norms can constitute additional vectors influencing ajudicial decision, perhaps
reinforcing and perhaps competing with the vectors provided by universal interpretive
methods. And in a given case, each Justice decides for herself which of the universal
methods and role-specific norms apply, and how much weight (if any) each should
receive. 15 1refer to this practice as atomistic enforcement of the norms.
The role-specific norm of deference to congressional judgments is frequently
defended on the ground that there is inevitably some political component to the process
of constitutional interpretation, both because giving meaning to vague constitutional
language often requires making some value choices, and because the invalidation of a
federal statute has peculiar political ramifications. Mediating between the legal and
political components ofjudicial review is a difficult and enduring conundrum; indeed,
perhaps as much ink has been spilled by jurists and scholars debating the proper level
of deference/aggressiveness of judicial review as on any other question of
constitutional law. Debate continues about whether courts ought to engage in judicial
review at all, of federal statutes or otherwise; and, if so, whether there are certain
categories of constitutional questions that should be considered immune from judicial
cognizance. 16 And where it is accepted that federal courts should entertain

separate article. See Caminker, supra note 12.
14. See, e.g., PHILIP BOBerrT, CONSTITUTIONAL FATE 1-119 (1982); JOHN HART ELY,
DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST (1980); Richard H. Fallon, Jr., A ConstructivistCoherence Theory of
ConstitutionalInterpretation, 100 HARV. L. REv. 1189, 1194-1209 (1987).
15. I do not mean to suggest that judges necessarily conduct this weighing process at a
conscious level ofdecisionmaking; for some judges, the interaction among role-specific norms
and universal approaches likely occurs at a subconscious level, or at least that interaction is
difficult to identify and articulate.
16. For example, for a recent suggestion that federal courts ought now to refrain from judicial
review entirely, see MARK TUSHNET,

TAKING THE CONSTITUTION AWAY FROM THE COURTS 154

(1999) (proposing that the Supreme Court issue a statement that "[w]e will no longer invalidate
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constitutional challenges, debate continues about the proper stringency of review for
particular types of constitutional claims, for example, tiers of scrutiny in equal
protection and substantive due process cases, and whether economic regulations
deserve intense or relaxed scrutiny. These doctrinal tests are almost invariably applied
no matter which government actor's decisions are being reviewed.' 7But if the Supreme
Court decides review is appropriate and brings a particular doctrinal standard to bear, a
final question remains: if the challenged act is a federal statute, what if any additional
level ofjudicial deference is appropriate?
The role-specific norm dictating that Justices entertaining constitutional challenges
to federal statutes should accord some degree of deference to those statutes or their
underlying legislative judgments has a rich historical pedigree, extending back to the
roots of judicial review within the American constitutional scheme. From the very
beginning, it was widely understood that to the extent federal courts had authority to
declare void acts of Congress, they could properly do so only when the constitutional
violation was quite clear. As Professor Larry Kramer recently described it, "[j]udicial
review was.., a power to be employed cautiously, only where the unconstitutionality
of a law was clear beyond doubt."' 8 Such an extremely deferential standard was
frequently reiterated by eighteenth and early nineteenth century judges. Justice Chase's
is exemplary: "Iwill never exercise [the power
proclamation in Hylton v. United States
'9
of review] but in a very clear case."'
Both Larry Kramer and Sylvia Snowiss have recently provided an insightful and
powerful historical explanation for this extremely deferential original stance. At this
early date, judges did not conceive of the Constitution as a species of ordinary law to
be consulted, interpreted, and applied during adjudication as if it were a hierarchically

statutes, state or federal, on the ground that they violate the Constitution"). For a defense of the
suggestion that federal courts ought not to engage in judicial review of federal statutes based on
asserted violations of principles of federalism or separation of powers, see JESSE H. CHOPER,
JUDICIAL REVIEW AND THE NATIONAL POLITICAL PROCESS 171-259 (1980).

17. For a rare exception, compare Mathews v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 67 (1976) (applying rationality
review to federal statute discriminating on grounds of alienage) with Graham v.Richardson, 403
U.S. 365 (1971) (applying strict scrutiny to state statute discriminating on grounds of alienage).
18. Kramer, supra note 5, at 79; see also WILLIAM R. CASTO, THE SUPREME COURT IN THE
EARLY REPUBLIC 222 (1995) ("Throughout the 1790s Justice Iredell and his fellow Justices
frequently reiterated the idea that the power ofjudicial review should be exercised only when the
statute in question was 'unconstitutional beyond dispute.'..."); SYLVIA SNOWISS, JUDICIAL
REVIEW AND THE LAW OF THE CONSTITUTION

36-37 (1990) ("[T]he actual practice of judicial

revie* [in the late eighteenth century] confirms that it was in fact reserved for the concededly
unconstitutional act," meaning "legislation regarded as clear violation of fundamental
[constitutional] law.").
19. 3 U.S. (3 DalI.) 171, 175 (1796) (emphasis in original); see also Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S. (3
Dail.) 386, 395 (1798) (Chase, J.) ("[1fI ever exercise the jurisdiction [to review legislation,] I
at 399
will not decide any law to be void, but in a very clear case.") (emphasis in original); id.
(Iredell, J.) ("The Court will never resort to [its] authority [to invalidate legislation] but in a
clear and urgent case."); Cooper v. Telfair, 4 U.S. (4 DalI.) 14, 19 (1800) (Paterson, J.) ("[T]o
authorise this Court to pronounce any law void, it must be a clear and unequivocal breach of the
constitution, not a doubtful and argumentative implication."); id. at 18 (Washington, J.) ("The
presumption... must always be in favour of the validity of laws, if the contrary is not clearly
demonstrated.").
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superior form of statutory or common law. Rather, the "clear beyond doubt" standard
reflected the understanding that judicial review was but a species of political resistance
to unconstitutional or ultra vires governmental action; just as citizens had a duty to
keep their legislature in check, so too did judges. Kramer describes the "first
approximation ofjudicial review" as
an argument that judges, no less than anyone else, should resist unconstitutional
laws. This obligation did not arise from any special competence the judges
possessed as judges, and it certainly was not based on the notion that constitutional
law was ordinary law subject to judicial control. It was, rather, simply another
instance of the right every citizen had to refuse to recognize the validity of
unconstitutional laws-a political duty and responsibility rather than a strictly
legal one.20
Given this motivation for review, it was quite understandable that the courts, acting
in essence as substitute or complementary agents for popular resistance to ultra vires
acts, would refuse to enforce a law only when its unconstitutionality was clear beyond
doubt.2'
The view that the Constitution was not "ordinary law" for purposes of judicial
interpretation gave way over the course of the nineteenth century, with this conceptual
move perhaps being put into motion by Chief Justice John Marshall's famous
proclamation that "[iut is emphatically the province and duty of the judicial department
to say what the law is" as part of his justification for exercising judicial review over an
act of Congress. 2 2 Slowly but surely over the course of the nineteenth century, the
Constitution morphed from a distinctive form of "fundamental law" operating with
political/moral rather than legal force on governmental agents into a superior source of
"ordinary law," different in degree but not kind from statutory and common law, and
hence enforceable by judges as a normal part of a court's function to bring the law to
23
bear on legal disputes.

20. Kramer, supra note 5, at 37; see also SNowIss, supra note 18, at 5-6 ("[Fundamental
constitutional law] was to be enforced by electoral or other political action. If these were
insufficient, revolution or the threat of revolution was the only recourse. If the judiciary
attempted to enforce fundamental law... the judiciary functioned necessarily as a substitute for
revolution."); id. at 50:
The judicial responsibility over unconstitutional legislation . . . derived
furthermore from thejudiciary's responsibility to 'the whole people,' and not from
any uniquely judicial relationship to fundamental law.... Enforcement of [that]
fundamental law was a political act, a peaceful substitute for revolution presented
as a superior alternative to petition or universal resistance.
21. Kramer, supra note 5, at 79; SNOWISS, supra note 18, at 6 (judicial invalidation was
limited to the "concededly unconstitutional act").
22. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 176 (1803).
23. Professor Snowiss suggests that Chief Justice Marshall essentially brought about this
transformation deliberately and almost single-handedly, largely by emphasizing the writtenness
of the Constitution and applying techniques of statutory construction to the constitutional text.
See SNowiss, supra note 18, at 3-4, 119-23, 172-75. Professor Kramer disputes this claim and
provides a more nuanced historical account of this transformation, drawing upon broader social,
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Despite this transformation in the understanding of the legal force of the
Constitution and hence function ofjudicial rule, many courts continued to adhere to a
"clear beyond doubt" standard ofjudicial review,24 and influential jurists and scholars
proclaimed new reasons for their doing so. Writing near the end of the nineteenth
century, James Bradley Thayer famously championed such deferential review in his
influential essay The Origin and Scope of the American Doctrine of Constitutional
Law, arguing that courts should employ a "rule of administration" according to which
federal legislation should not be invalidated "merely because it is concluded that upon
a just and true construction the law is unconstitutional., 25 Even though the
Constitution ought to be "regarded as so much law," 26 a court
can only disregard the Act when those who have the right to make laws have not
merely made a mistake, but have made a very clear one, -so clear that it is not
open to rational question.... This rule recognizes that, having regard to the great,
complex, ever-unfolding exigencies of government, much which will seem
unconstitutional to one man, or body of men, may reasonably not seem so to
another; that the constitution often admits of different interpretations; that there is

political, and intellectual developments of the first half of the nineteenth century. See Kramer,
supra note 5, at 90-110.
24. See, e.g., Fairbank v. United States, 181 U.S. 283, 285 (1901):
The constitutionality of an act of Congress is a matter always requiring the most
careful consideration. The presumptions are in favor of constitutionality, and
before a court isjustified in holding that the legislative power has been exercised
beyond the limits granted, or in conflict with restrictions imposed by the
fundamental law, the excess or conflict should be clear.
See also The Sinking-Fund Cases, 99 U.S. 700, 718 (1878):
It is our duty, when required in the regular course of judicial proceedings, to
declare an act of Congress void if not within the legislative power of the United
States; but this declaration should never be made except in a clear case. Every
possible presumption is in favor of the validity of a statute, and this continues until
the contrary is shown beyond a rational doubt. One branch of the government
cannot encroach on the domain of another without danger. The safety of our
institutions depends in no small degree on a strict observance of this salutary rule.
Other governmental officials also recognized the ubiquity of clear-error review. See, e.g.,
CONG. GLOBE, 40th Cong., 2nd Sess. 479 (1868) (Rep. Williams) ("[lI]t is a well-settled principle
that no act of the law-making power should ever be declared invalid upon constitutional grounds
unless it be a clear case."); id. at 488 (Rep. Wilson) (There is a rule of law that we are all
perfectly familiar with, that whenever there is a doubt in the mind of the court as to the
constitutionality of a law it is to be resolved in favor of the law ....). See generally Robert
Eugene Cushman, ConstitutionalDecisions by a Bare Majority of the Court, 19 MICH. L. REv.
771, 776 (1921):

The unanimity with which the doctrine of reasonable doubt has come to be
accepted as the only correct and orthodox rule ofjudicial construction is attested
by subsequent judicial utterances numbering into the thousands as well as by the
statements of practically every commentator in the field of constitutional law.
(citation omitted)
25. James B. Thayer, The Origin andScope ofthe American Doctrineof ConstitutionalLaw,
7 HARV. L. REv. 129, 144 (1893).
26. Id.at 138.
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often a range of choice and judgment; that in such cases the constitution does not
impose upon the legislature any one specific opinion, but leaves open this range of
choice; and that whatever choice is rational is constitutional. 2
In the end, "the ultimatequestion is not what is the true meaning of the constitution,

28
but whether legislation is sustainableor not."
Thayer himself provided (somewhat obliquely) several justifications for this
deferential standard for reviewing federal statutes. 29 First, many constitutional
questions have more than one reasonable answer, and choosing among them may
require policy and political determinations as well as the exercise of "practical
judgment" better left to Congress, 30 particularly because in many circumstances the
validity of such congressional judgments will never be litigated. 3 1 Second, and in part
because of the potentially final nature of congressional decisions, such decisions are
deserving of a measure of respect simply for being those of a coordinate governmental
agent. As Thayer puts it, "where a power so momentous as this primary authority to
interpret [the Constitution] is given [to Congress], the actual determinations of the
body to whom it is intrusted are entitled to a corresponding respect ....
Interestingly, Thayer's third reason-the one most famously associated with his
essay-is offered in the very last paragraph. His claim is that judicial enforcement of
the Constitution has and will continue to cause political institutions and populist
impulses to atrophy.3 3 Courts cannot ultimately safeguard the people from incursions

27. Id. at 144.
28. Id.
at 150 (emphasis in original).
29. Thayer specifically disclaimed such a deferential stance toward state legislative action,
suggesting that the justifications for the clear-mistake rule were applicable only to judicial
review of the acts of a "co-ordinate department." Id.at 154-55. This distinction is not selfevident as regards Thayer's third justification, the concern for atrophying of democratic or
populist impulses. See generally infra note 33 (describing and quoting Thayer's justification).
For a set of rich explorations of the deeper political motivations underlying Thayer's claims
in this essay, see Thomas C. Grey, Thayer's Doctrine: Notes on its Origin, Scope, andPresent
Implications,88 Nw. U. L. REv. 28 (1993); Stephen B. Presser, On Tushnet the Burkean and in
Defense of Nostalgia, 88 Nw. U. L. REv. 42 (1993); Mark Tushnet, Thayer's Target: Judicial
Review or Democracy? 88 Nw. U. L. REv. 9 (1993); G. Edward White, Revisiting James

Bradley Thayer, 88 Nw. U. L. REv. 48 (1993).
30. Thayer, supra note 25, at 135 ("[Constitutional questions] require an allowance to be
made by the judges for the vast and not definable range of legislative power and choice, for that
wide margin of considerations which address themselves only to the practical judgment of a
legislative body").
31. Id. at 135-36.
32. Id. at 136.
33. Here is the entire argument:
No doubt our doctrine of constitutional law has had a tendency to drive out
questions ofjustice and right, and to fill the mind of legislators with thoughts of
mere legality, of what the constitution allows. Moreover, even in the matter of
legality, they have felt little responsibility; if we are wrong, they say, the courts
will correct it. If what I have been saying is true, the safe and permanent road
towards reform is that of impressing upon our people a far stronger sense than they
have of the great range of possible harm and evil that our system leaves open, and
must leave open, to the legislatures, and of the clear limits of judicial power; so
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on their liberty, and thus democratic institutions and the people governed by and
governing them must take responsibility for defining and enforcing constitutional
norms. But this project of democratic/populist self-constraint needs the motivation of
necessity, which in turn means ajudicial safety net no more secure than that provided
34
by the clear-mistake "rule of administration."
Thayer's celebration of this clear-mistake (or sometimes "clear-error" or
"reasonable-doubt") standard of review was quite influential for a time, essentially
providing the starting point for discussions of judicial performance and potential
structural reforms throughout the Progressive Era.35 But after the failure of various
proposed institutional reforms during that period,36 the articulation and practice of

that responsibility may be brought sharply home where it belongs. The checking
and cutting down of legislative power, by numerous detailed prohibitions in the
constitution, cannot be accomplished without making the government petty and
incompetent. This process has already been carried much too far in some of our
States. Under no system can the power of courts go far to save a people from ruin;
our chief protection lies elsewhere. If this be true, it is of the greatest public
importance to put the matter in its true light.
Id. at 155-56. Whether Thayer was correct in his premise that aggressive review saps the vitality
of democratic/populist constitutionalism, of course, is subject to challenge. See, e.g., MICHAEL J.
19 (1982) ("(J]udicial review,
rather than deadening, can stir the polity's sense of moral responsibility .... "). But see Stephen
Gardbaum, The New Commonwealth Model of Constitutionalism,49 AMER. J. COMP. LAW 707,
PERRY, THE CONSTITUTION, THE COURTS, AND HUMAN RIGHTS

745 (2001) ("[lt has been widely acknowledged that [judicial review] tends to debilitate both
legislative consideration of matters of high principle and popular responsibility for rights
protection through the ballot.").
34. At times Thayer seems primarily concerned with energizing Congress to assume the
responsibility for sound constitutional (and moral) decisionmaking. See, e.g., James B.Thayer,
Constitutionalityof Legislation: The PreciseQuestionfor a Court, NATION, Apr. 10, 1884, at

314 ("[O]ur constitutional system, in its actual development, has tended to bereave our
legislatures of their feeling of responsibility and their sense of honor.. . ."). But it is clear that
Thayer did not hold Congress in particularly high esteem with respect to its predilections and
capacity. While in his famous Harvard essay he stated that "virtue, sense, and competent
knowledge are always to be attributed to" Congress, he also observed that "we often see, in point
of fact, in our legislative bodies, persons untaught it may be, indocile, thoughtless, reckless,
[and] incompetent ... ." Thayer, supra note 25, at 149. This observation suggests that his appeal
was primarily directed to the people behind the legislature. See PAUL W. KAHN, LEGITIMACY
AND HISTORY 86-87 (1992) ("Thayer perceives judicial review as weakening the responsible
exercise of popular sovereignty.").
35. See, e.g., Wallace Mendelson, The Influence of James B. Thayer upon the Work of
Holmes, Brandeis, and Frankfurter,31 VAND. L. REv. 71 (1978); see also former Justice
George Sutherland, Is the Proposalto "Curb" Powers of Supreme CourtSound?, THE CONG.

DIG. 272, 272 (1923) ("This important power of the courts to declare statutes void should be
exercised, as it has been almost universally exercised, only where the infringement of the
Constitution is so plain as to admit of no reasonable doubt in the mind of the judge."); Adkins v.
Children's Hosp., 261 U.S. 525,544 (1923) (Sutherland, J.) ("This court, by an unbroken line of
decisions from Chief Justice Marshall to the present day, has steadily adhered to the rule that
every possible presumption is in favor of the validity of an act of Congress until overcome
beyond rational doubt.").
36. See infra note 59.
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clear-mistake review as such continued to lose favor. Instead, the impulse to defer
tended to become folded into the particular doctrinal tests or standards constructed by
courts to give operational meaning to particular constitutional provisions or principles.
In particular, courts and individual Justices carved out large realms of constitutional
law for which the judicially devised doctrines merely required that governmental acts
have a "rational basis" to survive judicial review. Perhaps the famous Carolene
Products footnote four should be considered equally significant for the size of the
constitutional terrain it identified as subject to minimal judicial enforcement as for the
terrain it suggested should be subject to closer scrutiny. 3
At present, much of the work previously done by the clear-mistake rule continues to
be done by deferential doctrines implementing various constitutional provisions. In
some areas the Supreme Court purports to abstain entirely from scrutinizing the
validity of governmental decisions through the political question doctrine, and in other
areas the Court employs mere rationality review-which typically amounts to much
the same thing as abstention.3 8 (In still others, the Court does not defer much at all,
such as when addressing racial discrimination or censorship of political speech.) But
this built-in doctrinal deference generally does not distinguish between review of
federal statutes and review of other federal or state government acts. 39 Thus, it leaves
unaddressed the peculiar purpose of the original "clear-beyond-doubt" standard and
the Thayerian "clear-mistake" rule, specifically to implement a judicial stance of
deference to congressional statutes.
The modern-day remnant of Congress-specific deference lies in the oft-articulated
notion that the Supreme Court accords a general "presumption of constitutionality" to
federal statutes.4 ° On occasion, the Court will embellish this general proclamation,

37. See United States v. Carolene Prods., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938) (applying rationality
review to resolve a claim that the statute violated economic interests, but suggesting that such
deference might not be warranted when legislation "appears on its face to be within a specific
prohibition of the constitution," or "restricts... political processes" or is "directed at particular
religious, or national, or racial minorities").
38. See, e.g., FCC v. Beach Communications, Inc., 508 U.S. 307,313-14 (1993) (articulating
rational basis test for regulations "in areas of social and economic policy," and describing this
level of review as "a paradigm of judicial restraint"); Barry Friedman, Dialogue and Judicial
Review, 91 MICH. L. REv. 577, 591 (1993) ("Judicial deference is built into the system of
judicial review.... Courts view the vast majority of such governmental decisions through the
prism of low-level, or rational basis, scrutiny. Implicit in low-level scrutiny is deference to the
government's chosen course."); David A. Strauss, The Ubiquity of ProphylacticRules, 55 U.
CHI. L. REV. 190, 205-06 (1988) (explaining that "[o]ne of the principal justifications for
rational basis review is that the legislature is best able to assess the complex factual issues
underlying social and economic legislation; courts, lacking the legislature's fact-finding
capacities, are ill-equipped to second-guess its judgments").
For a laundry list of important congressional decisions or activities over which the
contemporary Supreme Court exercises no or only extremely deferential review under the rubric
of rational basis scrutiny, see Elizabeth Garrett & Adrian Vermeule, Institutional Design of a
Thayerian Congress, 50 DUKE L.J. 1277, 1284-85 (2001).
39. See supra note 17 and accompanying text.
40. See, e.g., United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 607 (2000) (noting that according to
the presumption of constitutionality, "[d]ue respect for the decisions of a coordinate branch of
Government demands that we invalidate a congressional enactment only upon a plain showing
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observing that "[tihis Court acts at the limits of its power when it invalidates a law on
constitutional grounds. In recognition of our place in the constitutional scheme, we
must act with 'great gravity and delicacy' when telling a coordinate branch that its
actions are absolutely prohibited absent constitutional amendment.'
And on
occasion, a Justice harkens back to the early articulations of the clear-error standard
and announces something to the effect of: "[B]ut even if this case were doubtful I
would heed Justice Iredell's admonition in Calderv. Bull... that 'the Court will never
resort to that authority, but in a clear and urgent case.' '42 In the main, however, a
succinctly phrased "presumption of constitutionality" is all today's Congress gets.
Contemporary scholars continue tojustify deferential review on Thayerian as well
as additional grounds. A more comprehensive list ofjustifications (some of which are
interrelated) could include the following:
(1) judicial deference to legislative judgments, presumably formed in good faith,
43
shows a proper institutional humility in the project of constitutional interpretation;
(2) at least where constitutional dictates are ambiguous or uncertain, legislative
value judgments are more worthy of respect in a constitutional democracy than are
judicial value judgments; and the countermajoritarian nature ofjudicial invalidation of
44
federal legislation entails expressive or symbolic costs;
(3) the cost of "erroneous" judicial invalidation of a federal statute is greater than
the cost of "erroneous" judicial validation because the former type of error can be
cured only by a constitutional amendment, whereas the latter type of error can be cured
45
by congressional repeal;
and last but not least, the claim most associated with Thayer:
(4) judicial deference can encourage greater legislative and popular responsibility
and accountability, whereas judicial scrutiny tends to lead to atrophy of democratic or
populist institutions.46

that Congress has exceeded its constitutional bounds"); Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173, 191
(1991) ("[A] decision to declare an Act of Congress unconstitutional 'is the gravest and most
delicate duty that this Court is called on to perform."'); INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 944
(1983) ("We begin, of course, with the presumption that the challenged statute is valid.").
41. Rust, 500 U.S. at 224 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
42. Plaut v. Spendthrift Farm, 514 U.S. 211, 267 (1995) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
43. See, e.g., James E.Flemming, The ConstitutionOutside the Courts, 86 CORNELL L. REV.
215, 244 (2000).
44. See, e.g., ALEXANDER BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH (1962).

45. See, e.g., Adrian Vermeule, The JudicialPower in the State (andFederal)Courts, 2000
SuP. CT. REV. 357, 396-97.

46. For a recent and powerful defense of the continued relevance of this last justification, see
TUSHNET, supra note 16, at 57-65. See also ROBIN WEST, PROGRESSIVE CONSTITUTIONALISM:
RECONSTRUCTING THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT 290-318 (1994).

Given the topic of this Symposium, I focus here solely on judicial deference to congressional
judgments, rather than those of other federal or state actors. I merely note here that most of the
contemporary arguments counseling deference to Congress do not operate with the same force
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Under the current voting protocol, each Justice gets to decide individually how
much (if any) weight to give to the presumption of constitutionality in any given
case-just as she gets to decide how much (if any) weight to accord to any other
universal or role-specific interpretive norm.47 Thus, the norm of Thayerian deference
operates by being internalized and implemented by Justices acting atomistically rather
than in concert. As such, different Justices are likely to give it different weight in
different contexts. And, as some scholars have surmised, perhaps the Justices generally
do not give it much weight at all.48
It is not surprising, therefore, that at various periods in history, including now,
many observers have charged that the Justices give Congress too little deference. And
it is equally unsurprising that, in those moments, critics have sometimes turned to an
alternative means of giving deference more oomph: imposing deference on the Court
through external constraints, rather than relying on internal norms.
II. THE HISTORICAL PEDIGREE OF SUPERMAJORITY RULES IN THE FEDERAL AND
STATE JUDICIAL SYSTEMS

In the past, whenever the Supreme Court has been perceived as being overly
aggressive in reviewing statutes and failing sufficiently to respect the norm of
Thayerian deference, politicians and scholars have been quick to propose various
direct and indirect ways of combating such aggression. Advocates of direct measures
seek to control the Court's decisions. Such measures include stripping the Court of its
jurisdiction to hear all or certain types of constitutional challenges to federal statutes,
and empowering Congress to override judicial invalidations of statutes by legislative
fiat. Advocates of indirect measures purport to influence the composition of the Court.
Such measures include stricter Senate oversight of the confirmation process, expanding
and hence packing the Court, or providing for recall of individual Justices through
impeachment proceedings or otherwise.
A lesser-known direct measure, imposing a supermajority protocol on the Supreme

with respect to federal executive officials (with the possible exception ofthe President) or state
legislative or executive conduct. See, e.g., Matthew D. Adler, Judicial Restraint in the
AdministrativeState: Beyondthe CountermajoritarianDifficulty, 145 U. PA. L. REv. 759, 844853 (1997) (challenging suggestion thatjustifications for Thayerian deference to federal statutes
should extend to administrative rules, orders, or actions); Thayer, supra note 25, at 154-55
(noting that his argument does not apply to state statutes).
47. One could ask (and maybe I will some other time) why decisions about which
interpretive methodologies to use and how to use them in a given case, unlike decisions about
what judicial doctrines to craft and apply, are not considered to enjoy the status of presumptively
binding precedent for subsequent adjudication. However, the principle of "every person for
herself" with respect to choosing interpretive practices is now well entrenched. The arguable
exception here is the norm of stare decisis itself, for which there is an oft-articulated set of
doctrinal rules. See, e.g., Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 491 U.S. 164, 171-75 (1989). Of
course, at times Justices appear to treat even this doctrine as merely hortatory rather than
binding.
48. See Steven G. Calabresi, Thayer's ClearMistake, 88 Nw. U. L. REv. 269, 275 (1993)
("[O]nce an American court has presumed a statute to be constitutional .... there is no need to
find that the legislature has made a clear mistake before its actions can be invalidated-any old
mistake, even an opaque one, is sufficient.").
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Court through congressional statute or constitutional amendment, turns out to have as
rich a historical pedigree as many ofthese other, more widely discussed methods. The
first such proposal was introduced in Congress in 1823, in response to the Court's
decision in Green v. Biddle,49 and would have required unanimity for the Court to
invalidate statutes.5 0 The most recent proposal appears to have been offered in
Congress in 1981.5 Over sixty proposals were introduced at various times in
52
between.
These proposals differed widely as to both the range ofjudicial decisions covered
and the degree of supermajority agreement required. With respect to range, some
proposals applied to all or a subset of invalidations of federal statutes; some applied to
all or a subset of invalidations of state laws; and the broadest ones applied to all
invalidations of federal and state statutes and state constitutional provisions.
Different proposals sought to require different degrees ofsupermajority consensus.
Some required the concurrence of only one more Justice than necessary for a bare
majority; others required unanimity; and still others required various numerical
permutations in between. One example of a representative proposal from the last halfcentury is as follows:
The Supreme Court may not in any case hold that any provision of an Act of
Congress, an Act of the legislature of any State, or a constitution of a State is
invalid because it violates a provision of the Constitution of the United States
unless at least six Justices of the Supreme Court concur in that holding. 53
Most of the supermajority proposals were prompted by Supreme Court decisions
thought by the reform proponents to be egregiously wrong. A few were more selfconsciously intended to forestall potential future Court action. I think the most
intriguing example of the latter was Representative Bingham's support in 1868 for a
colleague's supermajority proposal on the ground that it would make it more difficult
for the conservative Supreme Court to nullify the Fourteenth Amendment because of
the arguably coercive nature of its ratification procedure. 54 Only a few seem to have

49. 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 1 (1823) (holding a Kentucky statute governing land rights violated
the Impairment of Obligations of Contract Clause).
50. 41 ANNALS OF CONG. 28 (1823) (proposal of Sen. Johnson to require a concurrence of
seven Justices in any decision involving the validity of state or federal statutes).
51. H.R. 5182, 97th Cong. (1981) (proposal of Rep. Doman to require a concurrence of
seven Justices to declare a federal or state law unconstitutional).
52. 1have attached an Appendix listing sixty-three congressional supermajority proposals of
various shapes and sizes, and I do not represent this list as exhaustive. Infra app. at 117-22.
53. H.R. 11007, 90th Cong. (1967).
54. Statement of Rep. Bingham:
This great and victorious people, we are told, cannot amend their own
Constitution without the concurrence of some, at least, of the disorganized
communities who but yesterday rushed into war with arms in their hands and
attempted to batter down the holy temple of our liberties. I desire this [two-thirds
supermajority requirement) law to be passed so that the question shall only be
touched, if at all, by the consenting voice of two thirds of the judges of that
[Supreme] court; and then, if they dare do it, let an appeal again be taken from
their atrocious decision to the people.
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been pushed by nonpartisan proponents of "good government reform" in the abstract,
unhinged to a substantive agenda."
Of all the supermajority proposals floated throughout the past two centuries, the one
that galvanized the most extensive public discussion was that proposed by progressive
Senator William E. Borah of Idaho in February, 1923. And it was prompted by a string
of conservative 5-4 decisions most closely analogous to those "Federalism Five"
decisions that are the focal point of this Symposium.
At the time, Senator Borah introduced his proposal requiring the concurrence of
seven Justices to invalidate an act of Congress, 56 the Supreme Court had previously
invalidated provisions of federal statutes fifty-three times, with eight of those
invalidations being decided by a 5-4 bare majority. However, of those eight, four cases
(all involving important national issues---child labor, workers' compensation, the
income tax, and campaign finance) had been decided between 1918 and 1921, such
that an ominous trend was emerging. 7 And a mere two months after Borah introduced
his bill, the Supreme Court struck down a statute authorizing a minimum wage in D.C.
for women and children on a 5-3 vote, which assuredly would have been 5-4 had
Justice Brandeis not recused himself.58 At the time, one easily could have foreseen a
continuing barrage of 5-4 decisions invalidating federal statutes largely on federalism
grounds, just as one might foresee today.
Although a variety of political and social reasons prevented Senator Borah's
proposal from receiving serious congressional consideration, 59 the political pressure on
the Court may have, at times, led the Justices themselves to think twice about their
willingness to invalidate federal statutes in bare-majority decisions. Just after his
retirement from the Court, Justice Clarke reacted to the Borah proposal by noting:
It is no new suggestion that if the Court would give real and sympathetic effect to
this [clear-mistake] rule by declining to hold a statute unconstitutional whenever
several of the Justices conclude that it is valid-by conceding that two or more

40th Cong., 2d Sess. 484 (1868).
55. See Friedman, supra note 11, at 738 ("no matter how the discussion was framed at any
given time, at bottom, challenges to judicial independence have been motivated by disagreement
with the substance of judicial decisions"). For an example, see the remarks of Rep. Ramsey in
support of his two previously introduced supermajority proposals:
By a decision of 5 to 4, will [the American people] continue to permit this
[Supreme] Court to deny their Legislature the right to correct the evils and abuses
of the ownership of property that have for the past 50 years dictated the course of
legislation at the expense of human welfare? The courts apparently will not, or
cannot, recognize the changing social needs of the United States.
79 CONG. REC. 11097 (1935).
56. The text of his legislative proposal is reproduced supra note 9. During the next
congressional session, Senator Borah introduced a modified proposal imposing a 7-Justice
supermajority requirement for decisions declaring unconstitutional state as well as federal
statutes. See S. 1197, 68th Cong. (1923).
CONG. GLOBE.,

57. For a list of these cases, see CHARLES WARREN,

CONGRESS, THE CONSTITUTION, AND THE

183 (1925).
58. Adkins v. Children's Hosp., 261 U.S. 525 (1923); WARREN, supra note 57, at 183.
59. See ROSS, supra note 8, at 231-32; Steven F. Lawson, Progressives and the Supreme
Court: A CaseforJudicialReform in the 1920s, 42 THE HISTORIAN 419 (1980).
SUPREME COURT
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being of such opinion in any case must necessarily raise a "rational doubt"--an
end would be made of five to four constitutional decisions and great benefit would
result to our country and to the Court. To voluntarily impose upon itself such a
restraint as this would add greatly to the confidence of the people in the Court and
would very certainly increase its power for high service to the country.60
And almost a century earlier, supermajority proposals addressing the Court's decision
in Green v. Biddle invalidating a Kentucky statute on a paltry 3-1 vote 61 elicited the
following promise from Chief Justice Marshall: "The practice of this court is, not
(except in cases of absolute necessity) to deliver any judgment in cases where
constitutional questions are involved, unless four judges 62concur in opinion, thus
making the decision that of a majority of the whole court."
Although the supermajority concept never gained traction in the federal system,
similar measures were debated and ultimately endorsed by several states during the
Progressive Era. Indeed, by the time Borah introduced his proposal in the Senate, a
handful of states had already embraced the concept.
In 1912, the Ohio Constitutional Convention adopted a constitutional amendment
requiring a supermajority of six Justices out of seven to invalidate a state statute on
constitutional grounds: "No law shall be held unconstitutional and void by the supreme
court without the concurrence of at least all but one of the judges, except in the
affirmance of a judgment of the court of appeals declaring a law unconstitutional and
void., 63 Justices in the state courts had long enforced a clear-mistake rule through their
atomistic judgments, announcing that "[tihe repugnancy which must cause the law to
fall, must be necessary and obvious; if by any fair course of reasoning, the law and the
constitution can be reconciled, the law must stand." 4 Progressives who were upset by
a series of Lochner-esque invalidations of worker-protective state statutes perceived
the voting protocol as improving the balance between judicial vigilance and deference.
As the state court itself observed, the amendment "represents, as is known of all men, a
compromise between those of our people who sought to deny to the court the right to
exercise the power [ofjudicial review] at all and those who felt that the Supreme Court
should be unhampered by any such restriction., 65 And the provision had already
affected one case outcome before the Borah debates ensued: in Barker v. City of
Akron,66 the state supreme court upheld a state law requiring counties to pay the costs
of municipal special elections, notwithstanding a 4-3 insufficient majority voting to
strike it down.67

60. John H. Clarke, JudicialPower to DeclareLegislation Unconstitutional,9 A.B.A. J.689,
692 (1923).
61. 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 1(1823) (holding a Kentucky statute governing land rights violated
the Impairment of Obligations of Contract Clause).
62. City of New York v. Miln, 33 U.S. (8 Pet.) 120, 122 (1834).
63. OHIO CONST. art. IV, § 2 (1912).
64. Cass v. Dillon, 2 Ohio St. 607, 608 (1853).

65. State ex rel. Turner v. United States Fid. & Guar. Co., 117 N.E. 232, 234 (Ohio 1917).
For a history of the amendment's adoption, see Jonathan L. Entin, JudicialSupermajorities
and the Validity of Statutes: How Mapp became a Fourth Amendment Landmark insteadof a
FirstAmendment Footnote, 52 CASE W. REs. L. REv. 441,443-52 (2001).
66. 121 N.E. 646 (Ohio 1918).
67. For a discussion of the cases whose outcomes were dictated by the supermajority rule, see
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The Ohio voting protocol's inapplicability to cases in which the court of appeals
had already nullified the state statute caused problems over the next several decades
that eventually led to the protocol's demise. This exception meant that, whenever the
Supreme Court divided 4-3 or 5-2 to invalidate a state statute, the statute would be
declared invalid if the court of appeals had done the same, but the statute would be
upheld if the court of appeals had done the same. Critics assailed the system for
allowing the Supreme Court's judgment to turn on the decision of the lower court, as
well as for creating a situation in which the law could be different in different circuits,
and causing confusion as to the precedential status of 5-2 or 4-3 insufficient-majority
validations.6 8 Pressure mounted to fix this perceived problem, and in the end, the entire
supermajority protocol was repealed in 1968 70when the people approved a Modem
69
Courts Amendment to the state constitution.
Supermajority rules remain alive and well, however, in two other states that
embraced the concept in the Progressive Era. In 1919, the North Dakota Constitution
was amended to require four out of five Justices to invalidate a state law: "in no case
shall any legislative enactment or law of the state of North Dakota be declared
unconstitutional unless at least four of the judges shall so decide. 71 At least early on,
this protocol operated in addition to the Thayerian deference applied by individual

Entin, supranote 65, at 452-64; Katherine B. Fite &Louis B. Rubinstein, Curbingthe Supreme
Court-StateExperiences and FederalProposals,35 MICH. L. REv. 762, 774-79 (1937).One
such case turned into the landmark Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961) (applying the Fourth
Amendment exclusionary rule to states). In State v. Mapp, 167 N.E.2d 387 (Ohio 1960), Mapp's

challenge to the obscenity statute under which she was convicted (based on materials found
during a search of her home) was rejected notwithstanding the support of four of the seven
Justices.
In another early case in which the state voting protocol made a difference, the Supreme Court
of the United States rejected a federal constitutional challenge to the protocol. See Ohio ex rel.
Bryant v. Akron Metro. Park Dist., 281 U.S. 74 (1930), aff'g 166 N.E. 407 (Ohio 1929). The
Ohio Supreme Court rejected a taxpayer's challenge to state-mandated procedures for creating
and maintaining public parks on a 5-2 insufficient-majority vote. The taxpayer argued on appeal
to the Supreme Court of the United States that the Ohio voting protocol violated due process
because it biased the state supreme court against his claims. The Supreme Court rejected this
argument on the ground that resort to state supreme court review was itself a discretionary
benefit the state need not extend:
The opportunity afforded to litigants in Ohio to contest all constitutional and other
questions fully in the Common Pleas Court and again in the Court of Appeals
plainly satisfied the requirement of the Federal Constitution in this respect and the
state was free to establish the limitation in question in relation to appeals to its
Supreme Court in accordance with its views of state policy.
Akron Metro. Park Dist., 281 U.S. at 80. The Supreme Court also rejected an equal protection
challenge to the protocol on ripeness grounds. Id.
at 81.
68. See Entin, supranote 65, at 455-57; Robert L. Hausser, Limiting the Voting Power ofthe

Supreme Court: Procedurein the States, 5 OHIO ST. L.J. 54, 67-71 (1938).
69. 11 OHIO CONST. art IV, §2 (amended 1968).
70. See Entin, supra note 65, at 465-66.
71. N.D. CONST. art. IV, § 89 (repealedand reenactedas N.D. CONST.art VI, § 4 (1976)).
For a brief discussion of the state supreme court's view of the amendment in the years
immediately following its adoption, see Fite & Rubenstein, supra note 67, at 779-80.
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Justices. 2 This protocol avoids the practical difficulties faced in Ohio; if the North
Dakota Supreme Court votes 3-2 to invalidate a state statute, the statute is upheld
74
throughout the state. 73 This protocol has made the difference in a handful of cases.
In 1920, the Nebraska Constitution was amended to require five out of seven
Justices to invalidate a state law: "No legislative act shall be held unconstitutional
except by the concurrence of five judges., 75 Like North Dakota's, this protocol
operates in addition to the Thayerian deference applied by individual Justices. 76 And
like North Dakota, if the court votes by a insufficient majority to invalidate a statute,
the statute is upheld throughout the state.77 Unlike both Ohio and North Dakota,
though, the Nebraska supermajority rule applies to challenges to state statutes based on
the federal, as well as the state, constitution. 8 This supermajority protocol still

72. See, e.g., State ex rel. Sathre v. Bd. of Univ. and Sch. Lands of N. Dakota, 262 N.W. 60,
65 (1935) (stating that a state statute "must be presumed constitutional unless its repugnancy to
the constitution clearly appears or is made to appear beyond a reasonable doubt"). It is unclear
whether this "clear beyond doubt" standard prevails today or has slipped into desuetude, as a
Westlaw search failed to discover recent cases articulating this or an equivalent formulation.
73. See Edwin 0. Stene, Is There Minority Control of CourtDecisionsin Ohio?, 9 U. CIN. L.
REV. 23, 32-33 (1935) (In North Dakota, "if the court fails to secure a sufficient majority to
declare a statute unconstitutional, an order shall be issued in accordance with the opinion of the
minority who hold the act constitutional.").
74. See, e.g., Bismarck Pub. Sch. Dist. 1 v. State, 511 N.W.2d 247, 250 (N.D. 1994)
(upholding the state's school finance system despite the finding of three out of five Justices that
the system violated the state constitution). For other cases, see Entin, supra note 65, at 468
n.193.

75. Neb. Const. art. V, § 2. (amended 1920). For a history of the protocol's adoption, see
Paul W. Madgett, Comment, The "Five-Judge" Rule in Nebraska, 2 CREIGHTON L. REV. 329,
329-33 (1969); William Jay Riley, Comment, To Require that a Majority ofthe Supreme Court
Determine the Outcome of Any Case Before It, 50 NEB. L. REV. 622, 624-27 (1971). The

connection between a supermajority protocol and Thayerian deference was made clear in the
Convention debates. See, e.g., II JOURNAL OF THE NEB. CONST. CONY. 2845 (1920);
PROCEEDINGS OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION 1919-1920,2845 (1920) ("a legislative act
should stand as expressing the people's will unless it is clearly in violation of some provision of
the Constitution").
76. See Madgett, supranote 75, at 340; Riley, supranote 75, at 638.
77. Riley, supranote 75, at 628.
78. See DeBacker v. Brainard, 161 N.W.2d 508 (Neb. 1968) (rejecting a federal
constitutional challenge to the state Juvenile Court Act based on a right to jury trial and proof
beyond reasonable doubt standard by 4-3 insufficient-majority vote), appeal dismissed, 396
U.S. 28 (1969). The application of the state supermajority voting protocol to federal
constitutional challenges, essentially raising the hurdle for federal rights claimants, presents
interesting Supremacy Clause issues. See DeBacker v. Sigler, 185 Neb. 352, 175 N.W.2d 912,
914 (Neb. 1970) (Spencer, J., dissenting) (suggesting that the supermajority protocol is
unconstitutional as applied to federal claims because it "hampers the assertion of a federal right
and unreasonably discriminates against litigants asserting the constitutional invalidity of
legislation"). On the one hand, the protocol applies to state and federal constitutional claims
equally, so the protocol neither discriminates against nor appears motivated by hostility to the
federal claim. Compare Testa v. Katt, 330 U.S. 386 (1947) (at minimum, a state court cannot
discriminate against a federal claim or refuse to consider it based on policy objections); Howlett
v. Rose, 496 U.S. 356 (1990) (same). On the other hand, the protocol does mean that the state
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operates in Nebraska and occasionally dictates the outcome of a case.79
While the supermajority protocol never caught on in the federal system, it remains
alive and well in two states today (and on paper in a quirky way in a third). 80 Thus one

courts are not "open to" federal claims against state statutes on the same terms as their
counterpart federal courts are, a concern that the Court sometimes recognizes as a problem of
federal preemption to the extent the state procedure seems to frustrate the enforceability of a
federal claim. See Felder v. Casey, 487 U.S. 131, 141 (1988) (state cannot impose procedural
rule that "burdens the exercise of the federal right" in a manner that is "inconsistent in both
design and effect with the compensatory aims of federal civil rights laws"). Of course, those who
argue that state courts in general are less hospitable to federal claims than are federal courts
because of different institutional features (such as electoral accountability versus life tenure)
might be hard-pressed to distinguish between such institutional features that purportedly
influence atomistic judicial determinations and a voting protocol that influences the corporate
outcome those determinations produce.
79. See, e.g., State ex rel. Spire v. Beermann, 455 N.W.2d 749, 749-50 (Neb. 1990)
(upholding legislation despite the finding of four of seven Justices that the statute violated the
state constitution). For other cases, see Entin, supranote 65, at 468-69; Riley, supranote 75, at
631-33.
80. South Carolina has long had on the books an interesting hybrid protocol that combines a
supermajority rule in the first instance with a sophisticated majoritarian default plan in the event
of insufficient consensus. Five Justices sit on the South Carolina Supreme Court. If at least three
of them believe that a given case presents an issue of state constitutional law or a potential
conflict between state and federal law, the supreme court can resolve the conflict by itself only if
the five Justices unanimously agree as to the proper resolution. If not, then the court is enlarged
by adding to these five Justices all of the state's circuit court judges (excluding any that already
heard the case below). This new mega-court then decides the case based on simple majority rule.
So, a state or federal constitutional challenge to a state statute can succeed in the original
supreme court only by unanimous vote, but failing this, it can also succeed in the supplemented
court by majority vote.
I describe this protocol as "on the books" because it appears not to be followed in practice.
The hybrid super/simple-majority protocol was introduced into the South Carolina Constitution
in 1895. S.C. CONST. art V, § 12 (1895) (repealed 1973). It was immediately codified in
substantially similar language. See Act of Jan. 19, 1896, § 19, 1896 S.C. Acts 3, 8-9. That
codification has been carried forward, with changes not important here, to the present day. For
the current version, see S.C. CODES ANN. § 14-3-370 (Law. Co-op. 1976). The protocol was
deleted from the state constitution, however, in 1973. Act of Apr. 4, 1973, § 2, 1973 S.C. Acts
161, 162. In theory, the statute continues to require resort to the enlarged court whenever "the
entire court [of five Justices] is not agreed." §14-3-370(a). In fact, however, the five-Justice
court does occasionally resolve constitutional challenges with non-unanimous votes. See, e.g.,

State v. White, 560 S.E.2d 420 (2002) (rejecting constitutional challenge by four-to-one vote);
Lee v. S.C. Dept. of Natural Res., 530 S.E.2d 112 (2000) (rejecting constitutional challenges by
three to two vote). For a potential explanation, see JEAN HOEFER TOAL ET AL., APPELLATE
PRACTICE IN SOUTH CAROLINA 4 (1999):
In addition to sitting as a five-member court, the Supreme Court may conceivably
convene an en banc court composed of the members of the Supreme Court, as well

as those of circuit courts. See S.C. Code Ann. § 14-3-370 to 380 (1976). However,
it is an open question whether the statutes allowing the Supreme Court to sit en
banc are constitutional. The 1895 South Carolina Constitution made explicit
mention of the Supreme Court sitting en banc, but the 1973 revision of Article V, §
12, eliminated all references in the Constitution to the en banc court. See S.C.
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cannot quite say that simple majority rule is somehow inherent in or inextricably
linked to the very notion of constitutional adjudication. Rather, the voting protocol on
a multimember court must be chosen, with the choice turning on the role one wants
judicial review to serve.
III. USING A SUPERMAJORITY PROTOCOL TO ENFORCE THAYERIAN DEFERENCE

In the federal and most state court systems, the voting protocol is completely
agnostic concerning the weight any universal and role-specific interpretive norms are
given in any particular case. As explained earlier, these decisions are made by the
individual judges acting in atomistic fashion. To the extent Thayerian deference gets
any play, therefore, it is because judges have internalized this norm as part of the role
ofjudging, as one of the "rules of the game" of adjudication.
In contrast, a supermajority protocol operates externally on a multimember court's
decision as a corporate body. Specifically, a rule requiring supermajority agreement,
before the Supreme Court can invalidate a federal statute on federalism grounds,
means that the corporate product of the Court will exhibit greater deference to
congressional judgments completely independent of the level of Thayerian deference
practiced by individualmembers of the Court.
During the Progressive Era debates, Senator Borah and his supporters saw these
two mechanisms as conceptually linked, on the ground that close division within the
Court should translate into a reasonable doubt for each individual Justice. As one
commentator synopsized the argument:
Five judges believe that a statute is unconstitutional; four judges believe it to be
constitutional. Therefore the question of its constitutionality is a doubtful question.
That this doubt as to the constitutionality of the statute is a "reasonable doubt"
must of course be admitted unless one is to impugn the wisdom of the four
dissenting justices. Now the doctrine of reasonable doubt demands that the
Supreme Court shall presume every act of Congress to be constitutional and shall
continue to act upon that presumption until the unconstitutionality of the statute
has been demonstrated beyond a reasonable doubt. And yet in the face of a
reasonable doubt upon that question, a doubt evidenced by the fact that four of
their colleagues equally learned with themselves disagree with them, a bare
majority of the court presumes to pass final judgment that the act is void. It must
be quite obvious that such a decision is a virtual repudiation of the reasonable
doubt rule of construction."1

Const. art. V, § 12 (1895). The Supreme Court has not sat en banc since the
beginning of the twentieth century.
The South Carolina Supreme Court clearly does continue to enforce Thayerian norms
atomistically. See, e.g., State v. Gaster, 564 S.E.2d 87, 89-90 (2002) ("When the issue is the
constitutionality of a statute, every presumption will be made in favor of its validity and no
statute will be declared unconstitutional unless its invalidity appears so clearly as to leave no
doubt that it conflicts with the constitution.").
81. Cushman, supranote 24, at 782-83. See also Beulah Amidon Ratliff, May CongressLimit
the Supreme Court?, 118 NATION 579, 580 (1924):
The rule that the Supreme Court has always professed to follow in passing upon
the constitutionality of laws is that where reasonable doubt exists the statute shall
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In other words, the argument went, a corporate decision to invalidate a federal
statute based on a 5-4 split simply cannot be squared with the deference norms
82
governing atomistic decisionmaking.
It is sometimes unclear whether those advancing this argument had in mind a
subjective or objective understanding of doubt. Either way, the argument runs into
difficulties.
From the subjective perspective, the notion of reasonable doubt addresses the
degree of certitude or confidence with which an individual Justice personally believes
a federal statute is unconstitutional. The Thayerian deference norm requires a Justice to
ask herself whether, after giving due regard for the opinions of colleagues as well as
other sources of argument and insight, she is sufficiently confident that a federal
statute is unconstitutional, thatfor her the issue lies beyond a reasonable doubt. The
claim here is that, if four (or, for Borah, even three) of her colleagues believe the
statute is valid, then she cannot really believe the opposite with sufficient certainty to
vote to invalidate.
But thus stated, the argument is belied by reality. When the Court splits 5-4 in favor
of invalidation, obviously the contrary views of the four did not in fact create a

stand. The five-to-four decision is, on its face, an infringement of this rule, for,
where four of the learned judges disagree with the other five, everybody except
possibly lawyers and judges can see only ground for scoffing at the conflict
between the court's profession and practice.
82. Proponents of other supermajority protocols made the same point in defense of their own
legislative proposals. See, e.g., 47 CONG. REc. 3878 (1911) (statement of Sen. Bourne,
defending unanimity requirement):
[I]t has been held by the United States Supreme Court that no act of Congress
should be held to be in violation of the Constitution unless the conflict appears
beyond reasonable doubt ....

The Supreme Court has, however, in numerous

instances held to be unconstitutional acts of Congress which some of the members
of the Supreme Court believed to be entirely in harmony with our fundamental
law. In cases such as this there certainly existed a very substantial doubt whether
the measure in question was in fact in contravention of the Constitution.
62 CONG. REc. 896 (1922) (statement of Rep. McSwain, defending seven-Justice supermajority
requirement):
Courts approach the consideration of the constitutionality of a statute with the
declared major premise that the act is presumed to be constitutional and must be
found to be unconstitutional beyond a reasonable doubt .... And yet in the face of
this fundamental proposition we find five members of the court holding that State
statutes and acts of Congress are unconstitutional while four members of the same
court file vigorous and logical dissenting opinions, arguing that these legislative
acts are constitutional. We therefore have a right to ask why it is that the learned
and laborious dissenting opinions do not raise a reasonable doubt in the minds of
the majority.
72 CONG. REc. 6227 (1930) (statement of Sen. Brookhart, defending unanimity requirement):
[The Supreme Court] holds that it must appear beyond a reasonable doubt that [a
legislative enactment] is unconstitutional before the court will so decide. After
laying down that principle, four members of the court may find positively that an
act is constitutional and yet it is set aside by the other five as unconstitutional
beyond a reasonable doubt. In other words, the opinion of four learned judges
cannot even raise a doubt as to the constitutionality of a measure.
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reasonable doubt in the minds of the five, from their own subjective perspectives
(otherwise, the final vote would have been 9-0 against invalidation). Moreover, this
misdescribes to some extent how we reason:
To advance such a proposition is to advance something which is contrary to fact,
which is contrary to human nature, and contrary to the manner in which every man
conducts his personal or business life. Can a man never be clearly convinced of
anything, if some other man supposedly equal in intelligence differs from him? If
this were the case, there are few things of which any one could be convinced
beyond a reasonable doubt.83
According to the alternative objective understanding of doubt, Thayer's argument
dictates that a Justice cannot vote to invalidate a federal statute if an "objectively
reasonable" Justice would uphold it, notwithstanding her own personal view that the
constitutional challenge is persuasive. 4 And if four (or even three) of her colleagues,
presumably reasonable jurists acting in good faith, believe a statute to be
constitutional, this answers the question whether an objectively reasonable Justice
could do so.
Of course, Justices in the real world clearly do not act on this perspective either,
since again, if they did, we would never see 5-4 or 6-3 splits to invalidate federal
legislation. But at least here the argument has normative bite; Borah could coherently
say that the five or six Justices in such majorities should be voting to validate under
these circumstances, and the supermajority protocol is an appropriate tool to achieve

83. WARREN, supra note 57, at 204. As Robert Cushman put it:

[a] majority of the Supreme Court judges may firmly believe that a law is invalid
beyond all reasonable doubt in spite of the fact that the other four judges believe
with equal firmness that the law is valid. While judicially minded men would
naturally take due cognizance of opinions contrary to their own it is, of course,
ridiculous to assume that five men cannot feel perfectly sure that they are right
simply because four men whose opinions they respect disagree with them. Even
the most naive observer of human nature realizes that there is hardly anything
more futile than arguing with a convinced person.
Cushman, supra note 24, at 793. Cushman further noted:
[i]n an extended search [I have] found no case in which such a division of opinion
has been regarded as evidence that a reasonable doubt existed as to the invalidity

of the statute, which doubt must compel the court to uphold the law even when a
majority of the judges regarded it as invalid. Courts seem to have proceeded upon

the simple assumption that all the doctrine requires is that the majority of the court
be sure in their own minds that their conclusions are correct.
Id. at 794-95. To my mind (and Mark Tushnet's, who brought this to my attention), Cushman's
claim in the first quotation above-that the five Justices can feel "perfectly sure they are right"

and their colleagues wrong-is somewhat of an overstatement. I usually find it difficult to be
"perfectly sure" when other people I generally respect disagree with me. However, I do

sometimes remain confident in my views, notwithstanding such disagreement, after careful
consideration.

84. This objective perspective sounds more consistent with Thayer's own phrasing of the
clear-mistake standard: In the end, "the ultimate question is not what is the true meaning of the
constitution, but whether legislation is sustainable or not." Thayer, supra note 25, at 150
(emphasis in original).
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the same result.8 5
This objective perspective faces other difficulties, however-the first two of which
apply to the subjective perspective as well. First, there is a question of whether the
votes of the four or three Justices rejecting the constitutional challenges really provide
"objectively reasonable" evidence that a statute is constitutional. Obviously the claim
assumes that these Justices reached the merits of the constitutional challenge, rather
than refused to strike the statute down on other grounds. But even if they reached the
merits, is it clear that their decision to uphold the statute means that they found the
constitutional challenge unpersuasive? Or can it be that they themselves applied the
clear-mistake rule and determined that, while they also found the constitutional
challenge persuasive, it was not sufficiently persuasive to overcome their reasonable
doubts? If the Court is actually split between five Justices who believe a statute is
clearly unconstitutional and four Justices who believe somewhat uncertainly that the
statute is probably unconstitutional, the fact that the minority voted to uphold the
statute wouldn't seem to undermine the reasonability of the majority's position. 86 So
the argument works, if at all, only if the minority of four or three truly believe that the
federal statute is constitutional.
Even then, there is a question as to why only the views of the minority of four or
three Justices should count in determining whether the majority's position is
objectively reasonable. In other words, why say that a 7-2 split in favor of invalidation
is the right numerical tipping point? Why are the views of a minority of two
insufficient to influence the objective reasonability of the views of the majority of
seven? And why should only the views of fellow Justices count for these purposes, as
87
opposed to also the views of lower court judges and even legal scholars?
Finally, it is worth considering whether the fact of disagreement over a statute's
constitutionality logically means that either position is objectively reasonable, belying
the existence of a clear legislative mistake. The Supreme Court has rejected such a
claim in a somewhat analogous context. In Teague v. Lane,88 the Court held that a
federal habeas petitioner challenging a state conviction or sentence generally cannot
benefit from the application of a favorable but"new rule" of constitutional law. A rule
is "new" unless it is dictated by precedent existing when the petitioner's state

85. Cf Willis S. Siferd, Proposalsto Limit the Power of the Supreme Court in the SeventyFourth Congress, 4 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 381, 385 (1936) (Borah's proposal "attempt[s] to

substitute for the common law rule an act of Congress to determine how many dissenting votes
shall raise a reasonable doubt").
86. See Cushman, supra note 24, at 786; WARREN, supranote 57, at 206.
87. One might discount somewhat the views of scholars on the ground that their opinions
might not be similarly disciplined by the consideration of concrete facts and adversarial
presentation of legal positions, and by the knowledge that real world consequences turn on their
judgments. But neither of these grounds easily justifies the exclusion of lower court judges'
views as well as one's colleagues on the Court. Charles Warren asked a nice hypothetical about
a Justice who votes to uphold a statute in Case One and then retires right before the Court
decides similar Case Two; why should his view that the statute is constitutional suddenly lose its
relevance for the Thayerian inquiry the day he retires? See WARREN, supranote 57, at 205. One
might also ask why the views of the legislators who voted for the statute at issue should not
count in assessing objective reasonableness. See infra notes 122-124 and accompanying text.
88. 489 U.S. 288 (1989).
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conviction and sentence became final. 89 And this inquiry has been characterized as
whether "reasonable jurists" could disagree as to whether the sought-after rule is
dictated by precedent; if "reasonable jurists" could disagree, then a resolution of the
disagreement favoring the petitioner is "new." 90 But the Court has repudiated the claim
that the mere fact of actual, historical disagreement among (presumably reasonable)
lower federal court or state court judges logically means that the disagreement is
objectively reasonable. While "relevant," the fact that some courts have decided X is
not "dispositive" of the question whether X is an objectively reasonable interpretation
of existing precedent. 9' Similarly, one can respond to Borah that the fact that four or
three Justices believe a statute is constitutional is relevant to, but not dispositive of, the
objective reasonableness of holding a contrary position; the majority of five or six can
coherently maintain that the position of their remaining colleagues just is not
reasonably tenable.
In the end, Borah's suggestion that there is an inherent contradiction between a
closely-split decision to invalidate a federal statute and the atomistic standard of
reasonable doubt is unpersuasive, under either the subjective or objective
understanding. However, this rejoinder to Borah's justification really misses the
fundamental point. Whether or not the corporate and atomistic perspectives are
logically linked, it remains true that a supermajority protocol governing the Court's
corporate decisionmaking can serve as an independent mechanism for tempering the
aggressiveness of judicial review, one that can either replace or supplement an
atomistic norm of Thayerian deference. In other words, as a matter of systems design,
one can calibrate judicial review's degree of deference either through internalized
norms operating on individual Justices, or through external rules governing the
corporate aggregation of individual votes, or through both.
Surely this understanding is familiar from both legal and nonlegal contexts.
Consider jury determinations in criminal trials. The constitutional principle of the
presumption of innocence has both atomistic and corporate mechanisms of protection.
First, no individual juror can vote "guilty" absent atomistically determined confidence
that the defendant's guilt has been proven "beyond a reasonable doubt. 9 2 And second,
no jury can return a corporate decision of "guilty" absent a specific level of
supermajority concurrence.93

89. Id. at 301.

90. See, e.g., Butler v. McKellar, 494 U.S. 407, 415 (1990) ("new" rules include those that
are "susceptible to debate among reasonable minds"); Sawyer v. Smith, 497 U.S. 227, 234
(1990) (question is whether "reasonable jurists may disagree").
91. Stringer v. Black, 503 U.S. 222,237 (1992). See also Wright v. West, 505 U.S. 277,304
(1992) (O'Connor, J., concurring):
Even though we have characterized the new rule inquiry as whether "reasonable
jurists" could disagree as to whether a result is dictated by precedent ....the

standard for determining when a case establishes a new rule is "objective," and the
mere existence of conflicting authoritydoes not necessarily mean a rule is new.
(citation omitted and emphasis added) (citing Sawyer, 497 U.S. at 234; Stringer, 503 U.S. at
237).
92. In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 363 (1970).
93. See Johnson v. Louisiana, 406 U.S. 356, 366-80 (1972) (Powell, J.,concurring)
(requiring unanimity for federal jury trial; upholding state jury trial convictions by nine and ten
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For a familiar nonlegal example, consider a faculty's decision whether to promote a
colleague to tenure. Given the essentially lifelong commitment at stake, many believe
it appropriate for the faculty to place the bar quite high. Some schools effectuate that
normative judgment by articulating a high standard for atomistic faculty votes;
holding, for example, that a faculty member should vote for tenure only if she is highly
certain her colleague is well on his way to becoming a nationally respected leader in
his field. Other schools effectuate the same normative judgment by embracing a
stringent voting protocol; requiring, for example, that the colleague receive a twothirds supermajority of support, or that the colleague receive widespread support
"without substantial opposition." And some schools do both.
As these examples illustrate, the atomistic and corporate approaches can be viewed
as fungible substitutes, each separately calibrated to induce the same level of influence
on a decision; or the approaches can be used simultaneously, with the combination
calibrated for the optimal effect. 94 As noted above, the North Dakota and Nebraska
Supreme Courts employ both approaches together. And one federal proposal for a
constitutional amendment introduced in the New Deal Era would have mandated this
combination: "No law of the United States or any State shall be held to be
unconstitutional... by the Supreme Court unless two-thirds of the members thereof
95
shall specifically and by separate opinion find it so beyond a reasonabledoubt."
Thus, putting aside Borah's unpersuasive suggestion that a divided Court ought to
induce the majority to have atomistic doubts as to unconstitutionality, corporate
disagreement can itself be used as a basis for tempering judicial review through the use
of a supermajority protocol. If the Court operated under a rule requiring, say, six
Justices to invalidate a federal statute, most likely all of the federal statutes recently
invalidated by 5-4 decisions would instead have been upheld against constitutional
challenge.
I say "most likely" because some critics of supermajority rules suggest that one or
more Justices might react strategically and provide a sixth "courtesy vote" for
invalidation so as to allow the corporate decision under the supermajority protocol to
mimic the sincere decision under simple majority rule. 96 1 find this scenario unlikely.

out of twelve jurors). The supermajority requirement historically was derived from the Sixth
Amendment jury trial right rather than a due process concern for the presumption of innocence.
See Apodaca v. Oregon, 406 U.S. 404, 411-12 (1972) (White, J., plurality opinion). But see
Johnson,406 U.S. at 397 (Stewart, J., dissenting). But in any event, it protects due process just
the same.

Charles Warren questioned the analogy between judicial review and criminal juries, noting
that when a jury votes by insufficient-majority to convict, the corporate resolution is a "hung
jury," rather than adoption of the minority view of"not guilty." See WARREN, supra note 57, at
207-08. But the fact that there is a different default rule for failure to meet the supermajority
requirement does not undermine the important conceptual point that the protocol is still an

alternative means of influencing the corporate judgment.
94. Of course, such calibration would have to take into account the extent, if any, that
adoption of a supermajority protocol might lead individual Justices to place less weight on the
Thayerian deference norm than they used to do under a bare-majority regime.
95. See S.J. Res. 98, 75th Cong. 1st Sess., (Mar. 11, 1937) (Sen. O'Mahoney) (emphasis
added). The requirement ofa "separate opinion" for each of the supermajority members might be
thought to add yet a third procedural protection for statutes under review.
96. See Fite & Rubinstein, supranote 67, at 781 (asserting, without supportive evidence or
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Various strongly held norms favoring sincere voting counsel against such bald
strategic behavior,97 and a Justice would have to be quite passionately committed to the
concept of majority rule to be willing to sacrifice what she views as "correct
outcomes" in favor of "wrong but bare-majority-backed outcomes. 98 Perhaps she
would be willing to do so if she felt confident that her colleagues would similarly
sacrifice their views to support her in a future case when she is in the bare-majority
camp. But since in each case only one Justice would need to sacrifice herself, it would
be difficult for the group to ensure an equitable level of sacrifice for all, and thus to
police effectively against defections. In the main, therefore, adoption of a
supermajority protocol would likely change the outcome of at least most, if not all,
bare-majority decisions. 99

explanation, that "ft]here is at least some indication, so deeply embedded in our make-up is the
belief in the rule of the majority, that where a majority concurs in the unconstitutionality of an
act, judges who would otherwise dissent may sometimes concur for the sake of making up the
requisite number to hold legislation invalid").
97. See Evan H. Caminker, Sincere and Strategic Voting Norms on Multimember Courts, 97
MICH. L. REV. 2297, 2333-79 (1999).
98. To be sure, sometimes within the traditional majority-rule paradigm would-be-dissenting
Justices decide to suppress their sincere views and instead join the majority-although the
frequency of such dissent-suppression has declined in recent decades. See, e.g., Gregory A.
Caldeira & Christopher J.W. Zorn, Of Time and Consensual Norms in the Supreme Court, 42
AM. J.POL. Sci. 874 (1998); Lee Epstein et al., The Norm of Consensus on the US. Supreme
Court, 45 AM. J.POL. Scd. 362 (2001); Thomas G. Walker et al., On the Mysterious Demise of
ConsensualNorms in the UnitedStatesSupreme Court, 50 J.POL. 361 (1988). And in particular,
there is evidence that when the Court is under attack, including during the Progressive Era,
Justices are particularly willing to vote strategically in this manner to create a false appearance
of solidarity. E.g., Robert Post, The Supreme Court Opinion as InstitutionalPractice:Dissent,
Legal Scholarship,andDecisionmaking in the Taft Court, 85 MINN. L. REV. 1267, 1314 (2001)

("There is some internal evidence, for example, that during the first half of the 1920s, dissent
was suppressed within the Court because of the need to fend off external attacks."); The
Brandeis-FrankfurterConversations, 1985 SUP. CT. REv. 299, 330 (Melvin I. Urofsky ed.,
1985) (quoting Justice Brandeis in July, 1924) ("[T]hat is the one positive result of Borah 7 to 2
business [meaning the threat of Borah's legislation], to suppress dissent so as not to make it 7 to
2.") (footnote omitted).
But strategic dissent suppression in these contexts does not change the outcome of the case; it
merely changes the publicly revealed numerical division. The antisupermajority claim here is
much stronger, that a member of a four-Justice minority coalition would agree to switch her vote
even though (nay, because) that would have the effect under the supermajority protocol of
switching the Court's corporate judgment. It is this claim I find dubious, though it is often
difficult to predict in advance how changes in institutional rules can affect social norms which,
in turn, influence individual behavior.
99. Of course, it may be that the likelihood of strategic voting would depend on the level of
supermajority consensus required for invalidation. For example, suppose a voting protocol
required unanimous agreement for invalidation, such that the frequency of invalidation based on
sincere voting would decline significantly. If in a given case, the Court sincerely votes 8-1, or
maybe 7-2, for invalidation, it is perhaps somewhat easier to imagine the would-be dissenters
deciding to suppress their own views for the sake of maintaining the institutional potency of the
Court. Under a unanimity rule, it is easy to identify the "holdouts" whose recalcitrance thwarts
the majority, for purposes of levying informal sanctions; and no member of the minority has a
strong incentive to hold out while hoping another member of the minority switches.
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So Senator Borah claimed too much when he suggested, perhaps for strategic or
rhetorical reasons, that the notion of "reasonable doubt" at the atomistic level entailed
a rule of supermajority consensus at the aggregate level. But Borah was nevertheless
correct to observe that a supermajority protocol could provide an alternative route to
enforcing a regime ofjudicial deference to congressional decisions. And the fact that
three states embraced this route with two still following it today means, at a minimum,
that Borah's vision cannot fairly be dismissed out of hand as a potential tool by
proponents of strong judicial deference.
IV. LEARNING SOME LESSONS ABOUT ENFORCING THAYERIAN DEFERENCE
00
In this section, I consider the major criticisms (other than unconstitutionality )
launched against Senator Borah's and others' proposed supermajority protocols in the
Progressive Era, with two goals in mind. I explore preliminarily some of the
advantages and disadvantages of employing the protocol, rather than atomistic norms,
to secure the optimal level of Thayerian deference to congressional judgments. More
importantly, I draw from this evaluation of supermajority rule some important lessons
for the prevailing practice of atomistic deference.

A. Assessing the Optimal Strength of Thayerian Deference
Both in the Progressive Era and in other times, proposed supermajority protocols
differed widely in their prescribed degrees of consensus. Since the advent of the nineJustice Court, proposals have ranged from requiring consensus among a low of six to a
high of nine out of nine Justices. This variation obviously raises the question as to
what specific degree of required judicial consensus reflects the "ideal" amount of
judicial deference. Is a unanimity requirement too strict? Is a two-thirds requirement
too lax?
Proponents of particular supermajority protocols were virtually silent (at least in
public records and discourse) as to why they championed a particular option. Borah,
for example, appears never to have publicly explained why he believed a six-Justice
consensus requirement was too weak but a seven-Justice consensus requirement was
just right. Perhaps this is not surprising. To provide a fully principled defense of a
particular protocol, one would first have to devise a satisfying theoretical explanation
as to why the optimal all-things-considered level of Supreme Court deference to
congressional determinations is X, and then determine empirically that a requirement
of Y-Justice agreement will come closest to securing X amount of deference in
operation. Neither step of this two-step justification comes easily.10 1

100. See Caminker, supra note 12.
101. For the most part, public justifications for particular protocols drew upon
impressionistic judgments and claimed connections between a specified level of consensus and
proper implementation of the "reasonable doubt" atomistic standard. See, e.g., 79 CONG. REC.
7730 (1935) (remarks of Rep. Ramsay) ("Such decisions by the Court [declaring federal statutes
unconstitutional] should be unanimous or by such a preponderance of the Court, so that no
reason for doubt of the correctness and fairness of the decision could be left in the minds of the
average citizen."); 72 CONG. REc. 6227 (1930) (remarks of Sen. Brookhart) ("In ajury one vote
not only raises a doubt but entirely defeats the verdict; and in a court where all are learned and
trained to the law, as the members of the Supreme Court are trained, it seems to me that one vote
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Some might view the reformers' failure to offer some grand theory of optimal
deference to support their preferred protocols as a devastating lacuna. Of course,
opponents equally failed to explain why bare majority rule secures an optimal level of
deference, and there is no a priori reason to believe that it does. But at least majority
rule provides the comfort of historical familiarity and almost ubiquitous application.
So why should we deviate from longstanding tradition to embrace an alternative that
reflects an arbitrarily chosen degree of deference? 0 2
For others, this critique may not be so telling. Sometimes institutional designers
have to make impressionistic judgments when drawing necessarily bright lines. 03 It
seems doubtful, for example, that the Framers could have provided a nuanced
theoretical justification for why the optimal required supermajority for congressional
override of a presidential veto is two-thirds of each House, rather than three-fifths or
three-fourths; or why the optimal required supermajority for ratification of
constitutional amendments by the several states is three-fourths rather than two-thirds
or four-fifths. As the Ohio Supreme Court recognized with respect to its own sixdecade supermajority experiment, any such requirement necessarily represents a
"compromise" between the polar positions of majority rule and abolishing judicial
review entirely.' 0 4 One can imagine an intelligible debate among proponents of

by a member of the court should raise a doubt."); 62 CONG. REc. 896 (1922) (remarks of Rep.
McSwain) ("Ifthe Constitution has been violated by an act of Congress or of a State legislature,
that violation ought to be so manifest that at least seven judges out of nine can see it and declare
it."); id. at 897:
It is not unreasonable that seven justices of the court should be required to agree
before they can set aside the sovereign will either of the Nation or of the State. To
allow a dissent of two justices is more than ample to take care of the personal
equation and individual idiosyncrasies. It is hard to get all men to agree upon any
one proposition, but it ought not to be difficult for seven out of nine men learned in
the law [to agree that a statute is constitutional if in factit is clearly so].
102. Cf Barry Friedman, The History of the Countermajoritarian Difficulty, Part II:

Reconstruction'sPolitical Court, 91 GEO. L.J. 1, 2 (2002) ("Too much judicial independence
may threaten popular sovereignty; too little may undermine individual liberty. It is important to
get it right.").
103. See,e.g., Burch v. Lousiana, 441 U.S. 130, 137 (1979) (invalidating conviction by nonunanimous six-person jury, conceding "we do not pretend the ability to discern aprioria bright
line below which the number ofjurors participating in the trial or in the verdict would not permit
the jury to function in the manner required by our prior cases. But... it is inevitable that lines
must be drawn somewhere if the substance of the jury trial right is to be preserved."(citations
omitted)). As Justice Holmes put the point in a different context:
When a legal distinction is determined, as no one doubts that it may be, between
night and day, childhood and maturity, or any other extremes, a point has to be
fixed or a line has to be drawn, or gradually picked out by successive decisions, to
mark where the change takes place. Looked at by itself without regard to the
necessity behind it the line or point seems arbitrary. It might as well or nearly as
well be a little more to one side or the other. But when it is seen that a line or point
there must be, and that there is no mathematical or logical way of fixing it
precisely, the decision of the legislature must be accepted unless we can say that it
is very wide of any reasonable mark.
Louisville Gas & Elec. Co. v. Coleman, 277 U.S. 32, 41 (1928) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
104. See State ex rel. Turner v. United States Fid. & Guar. Co., 117 N.E. 232, 234 (Ohio
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different degrees of supermajority rule, focusing on the relative strength of the various
justifications for having courts yield to congressional judgments even without being
able to articulate a convincing grand theory of deference.
Surely the apparent arbitrariness of choosing any particular degree ofsupermajority
consensus to secure judicial deference should give at least some, if not substantial,
pause. But does that mean it is conceptually preferable instead to leave the decision
about deference in the hands of individual Justices?
The problem is that this critique actually extends with equal force to the project of
securing Thayerian deference through atomistic decisionmaking. Should deference to
Congress merely be a "tiebreaker," such that a Justice should give dispositive weight
to the norm only if she is in virtual equipoise over whether a federal statute is
unconstitutional? Or should the norm have some real bite, as the doctrines of "clear
mistake" or "reasonable doubt" imply? Just as supermajority proponents failed to
explain why they preferred a specific degree of consensus, Justices who routinely
articulate some commitment to defer atomistically never explain what terms such as
"clear error" or "presumption of constitutionality" mean in practice, let alone why they
capture an optimal model ofjudicial review. If one would criticize Borah for having
only an impressionistic rather than an analytically rigorous defense of a seven-ninths
requirement, one should be equally concerned that adherents of conventional atomistic
enforcement of Thayerian deference face the same problem ofjustification.
And once a particular consensus level is chosen for a supermajority requirement, at
least the resulting degree of deference achieved should remain stable over time. In
contrast, the actual weight given Thayerian deference by Justices acting atomistically
will likely vary somewhat from case to case and context to context. Indeed, there are
reasons to worry that Justices making atomistic decisions will tend, in general, to give
less weight to the deference norm in practice than they themselves might describe as
optimal. First, from the subjective perspective, Justices might be somewhat reluctant to
admit to themselves-and candidly express to the public-that they are appreciably
unsure of a given constitutional judgment. At the same time, Justices will likely be
loath to open themselves up to criticism by scholars and pundits by appearing to
endorse a congressional judgment that in fact they think is probably (but not certainly)
wrong. And we all know how easily we can convince ourselves of a particular answer,
even after having to wrestle with the problem for quite some time. Perhaps for these
reasons, Larry Sager has suggested that the subjective approach to the Thayerian norm
"is idiosyncratic to a judge's
style of reason and discourse and would offer only rare
05
and flickering deference."'

1917).
105. Lawrence G. Sager, Justice in Plain Clothes: Reflections on the Thinness of
ConstitutionalLaw, 88 Nw. U. L. REv. 410,413 (1993); see also The Supreme CourtAgain,34
NEW REPUBLIC 59, 60 (1923):

Surely the fact that three of four judges of the court consider the law constitutional
should raise enough doubt in the minds of their brethren to bring the [clear-

mistake] rule into operation. The fact is, however, that it does not, and the capacity
to see any virtue in a view which opposes one's deep-seated convictions is so rare
that one may well doubt whether the rule is ever capable of being imposed by the

court as a restraint upon its own action.
A pressure to feel as though one is sure of her answer would not similarly dissuade a Justice
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Second, a collective action problem might tend to discourage Justices from
atomistically placing great weight on Thayerian deference. Any time a Justice decides
to defer to Congress rather than embrace the constitutional interpretation she believes
is correct (despite some uncertainty), she in a sense forfeits an opportunity to bring the
Constitution-in-operation closer to what she perceives as the Constitution-as-ideal. If
each Justice gives the same weight to Thayerian deference, then over time each Justice
will forfeit approximately the same amount of interpretive power in this regard.
But suppose a Justice worries that, even though she consistently gives some weight
to Thayerian deference, her colleagues will give less or no weight. Over the course of
time, the deferring Justice will end up forfeiting her power to bring the operational
Constitution in line with her ideal far more than will her colleagues. In a sense, she
will bear all of the cost of nonideal judgments associated with producing the public
good of deference to Congress. To the extent she cares (and surely all Justices do, to
some extent) about implementing the ideal Constitution as she defines it, she will be
reluctant to bear this cost alone. Absent some external force that can police uniform
compliance with the Thayerian norm-say, a supermajority protocol-she might react
to this possibility by deemphasizing deference in her own atomistic decisions. And
since each Justice will likely make
the same calculation, the norm might end up
06
underenforced across the board.1
All of this provides reason to question whether, when push comes to shove, Justices
enforcing the Thayerian deference norm through their own atomistic decisions will end
up giving it as much weight in practice as they might desire to do in theory.
Of course, one could still extol the virtues of flexibility, claiming that at least under
the atomistic approach, Justices can decide at different times and in different contexts
that congressional deference ought to be given different weight. For example, Justice
Scalia recently suggested that today's Congress might deserve less deference than in
the past because it is not currently taking seriously its responsibility to think about the
constitutionality of its own decisions.' 0 7 Presumably, this comment suggests, Justice

from giving weight to other role-specific norms that do not similarly trade on any sense of
insecurity. For example, Justices frequently take into account judgments about the institutional
competence ofjudicial or other actors to implement properly various doctrinal rules. See, e.g.,
Strauss, supranote 38 (highlighting Fifth Amendment, First Amendment, and equal protection
jurisprudence before generalizing to almost all constitutional doctrine). But this role-specific
norm helps the Justice identify the optimal doctrinal rule; it does not highlight the presence of
uncertainty.
On the other hand, the role-specific norms of stare decisis (deference to prior Court
decisions) and collegiality (deference to colleagues in a given case) do similarly require selfconscious reflection on levels of uncertainty; the more unsure a Justice is as to the "right
answer" in a given case, the more likely she is to defer to past or present colleagues. Caminker,
supra note 97, at 2313-22. Perhaps a reluctance to feel and publicly reveal uncertainty helps
explain the groundswell of criticism that Justices today give too little weight to stare decisis and
collegiality, and perhaps this justifies exploring whether these role-specific norms could
productively be secured through externally imposed voting protocols as well. See Caminker,
supra note 12.
106. For a similar analysis applied to the norms of stare decisis and collegiality, see
Caminker, supra note 12.
107. See A Shot from Justice Scalia, WASH. POST, May 2, 2000, at A22 (quoting speech by
Justice Scalia stating that "[i]f Congress is going to take the attitude that it will do anything it
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Scalia would in the future defer more if and when Congress changed its errant ways.
The atomistic approach, unlike a relatively fixed voting protocol, allows for this type
of contextual judicial tailoring. One thus could advance here the conventionally
claimed advantages of "standards" over "rules."
But flexibility is purchased at a price. Flexibility seems desirable, if one trusts
Justices to defer more when they should and less when they should not. But the
pressures identified above to underweight deference might lead Justices enjoying
discretion to "find" reasons for nondeference more than they perhaps should." 8 If one
really wants to secure a meaningful level of Thayerian deference, perhaps the only sure
and stable mechanism is an externally imposed supermajority rule.
In the end, the difficulty of identifying an optimal level of Thayerian deference is
problematic for the entire project of properly restraining judicial review. But the
problem lurks within either the atomistic or corporate means of enforcing such
restraint.
B. BifurcatingLegal Reasoningand Legal Outcomes
Two other frequent criticisms of the Borah proposal reflected a common theme: that
the supermajority protocol would lead to a regime of "minority rule," and thereby
drive a wedge between majoritarian legal reasoning and corporate legal outcomes. The
first criticism focused on the discontinuity between the majority's legal view of the
constitutional challenge (statute is unconstitutional) and the result of that challenge
(statute is nevertheless upheld), and argued that this wedge would diminish public
respect for the Court. The second focused on the discontinuity between the majority's
legal view of who should win (the constitutional claimant) and the result of the case
(constitutional claimant loses), and argued that this wedge would be unfair to litigants.
After developing both strands of this theme, I suggest that this concern applies as well,
though in less visible fashion, to the conventional atomistic mechanism of securing
Thayerian deference.
1. The Complaint about.Disrespect for the Court
As a leading Progressive, Senator Borah was surely disturbed by the fact that the
Court's closely divided rulings in the early Twentieth century reflected a conservative
ideology. But he also seems to have been genuinely worried that the sudden spurt of 54 invalidations was bad for the Court as an institution. Borah believed that closely
divided decisions "seem[ed] to breed an atmosphere of mistrust," 9 and others, such as
former Justice John Clarke, worried with him that citizens resented the appearance or

can get away with and let the Supreme Court worry about the Constitution... then perhaps that
presumption [of constitutionality] is unwarranted.").
108. Justice Scalia himself frequently defends the desirability of imposing on himself and
other judges reasonably clear rules rather than indeterminate balancing tests, in part to protect
against the inevitable impulse in certain cases to balance interests differently. See Antonin
Scalia, The Rule of Law as a Law of Rules, 56 U. CHI. L. REv. 1175 (1989).

109. William E. Borah, Five to Four Decisions as Menace to Respectfor Supreme Court,
N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 18, 1923, at 21.
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implication of"[o]ne man power." ' 10 Even the most strident scholarly critic of Borah's
proposal, Charles Warren, observed respectfully that "Senator Borah, in spite of his
unnecessary and unwise proposal, remains an ardent admirer and upholder of the
Court.""' Borah believed that, in the long run, forestalling a continuing series of 5-4
invalidations of federal statutes would be an important step in restoring public respect
for, and ultimately ensuring the moral authority of, the Court." 2
While Borah certainly had a point, one of the most common and ardent criticisms of
his proposal was that a supermajority protocol would, on balance, actually diminish
popular respect for the Court. Opponents of the Borah proposal characterized it as
leading in constitutional cases to "minority rule," in the sense that a minority of
Justices on the Court could dictate the outcome of a constitutional challenge to a
federal statute. Many public leaders, scholars, and pundits viewed such "minority rule"
as an anathema, and predicted that the public could not respect judicial decisions
driven by a minority sentiment. Some questioned the likely stature of a congressional
act upheld against challenge by minority vote:
What degree of authority would such a law possess, when the people of this
country knew that six out of nine Judges believed it to be unconstitutional, and
that it was the law only because, under the Borah proposal, the vote of the six

110. Clarke, supra note 60, at 691; see also id. at 692:
Treating this much emphasized rule as a reality and not a mere form of words, it is
difficult for men not steeped in legalistic thinking and forms of expression to
understand how five judges can agree that an Act of Congress is unconstitutional
"beyond rational doubt" and that by "clear and indubitable demonstration" they
have shown it to be so, when four of their associates, equally able and experienced
judges, who have heard the same arguments on the same record declare that to
them "upon the basis of reason, experience and authority" the validity of the Act
"seems absolutely free from doubt.
15 NEW REPUBLIC 157, 159 (1918) (commenting on the 5-4 invalidation of child labor statute in
Hammer v. Dagenhart,247 U.S. 251 (1918), that "[i]n the long run American opinion will not

consent to have social legislation invalidated and its social progress retarded by the necessarily
accidental and arbitrary preference of one judge in a court of nine."); 79 CONG. REc. 7730
(1935) (remarks of Rep. Ramsay):

The 5-to-4 decisions of our highest Court in the land sound to the average citizen
like the betting odds at a horse race, and, in fact, it leaves the American mind in
doubt just what is or should be the law. Such decisions only shake the confidence
of the people in the judgment of this great tribune.
111. WARREN, supra note 57, at 179 n.l.
112. See 64 CONG. REc. 3960 (1923) (article by Sen. Borah):

One cannot be justly charged with undue national pride when he declares that the
Supreme Court of the United States is the most exalted judicial tribunal in the
world, not a court beyond the possibility of error, not a court whose opinions are
deemed above the reach of fair and honest criticism, but a court which, whether
viewed as to the reach and scope and power of its jurisdiction or as to its influence
and standing, its ability and learning, its dedication and consecration to the service

of mankind, is the greatest tribunal for order and justice yet created among men. If,
therefore, the machinery of the court can be geared to a higher plane and greater
accuracy, thereby insuring its judgments greater support and approval, that should
be our willing task.
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would not 13prevail, and the vote of the three Judges in the minority would decide
the case?'

But the predominant concern was disrespect for the Court, the claim being that the
public could never support judicial decisions driven by the minority over the majority.
As one commentator put it, "Every time six out of the nine Justices pronounced a law
unconstitutional and the law nevertheless went into effect, the country would witness a
to the Court's prestige than any that is now presented [by
spectacle far more damaging
'
5-4 invalidations]." 14
2. The Complaint about Unfairness to Litigants
A second frequent criticism also concerned the bifurcation of reasoning and result,
this time from the perspective of litigants. Opponents ofsupermajority rules repeatedly
proclaimed that the Supreme Court does not sit to decide legal issues in the abstract,
such as whether or not a statute is constitutional. Rather, the Court sits to adjudicate
actual controversies involving people or institutions as adversarial parties. The Borah
proposal, it was said, would divert the Court away from an impartial inquiry into
which litigant should win, instead allowing the protocol to tip the scales of Justice
against the federal claimant.
Charles Warren framed this concern with the following hypothetical:
That the proposed bill contemplates actual control by the minority is to be seen
clearly, when one reflects that a decision of a Court is not a decision upon an
abstract question or upon the general proposition of the validity or invalidity of a
statute. Every decision of a Court is a positive Act, deciding and establishing
which of two persons or parties, litigating before it, is right. It is a decision that X,
an actual person, has certain rights as a plaintiff or defendant, and that
correlatively Y, another actual person, as defendant or plaintiff, has not certain
rights. John Citizen claims that he has a right against James Voter based on a
Federal statute; James Voter denies this and says that he has a right based on some
provision or guaranty of the United States Constitution; the Supreme Court [is]
then called upon to decide which right shall prevail.... Senator Borah's proposal
is that a minority of the Court, and not a majority, shall decide these rights, in
cases where one party relies on a Federal statute and the other party relies on the
Constitution. His proposal [is] that Congress shall step in and say to the Court: "If
a case is before you in which John Citizen, a plaintiff, relies on an Act of
Congress, and James Voter, a defendant, relies on the Constitution, and claims the
statute to be invalid, then if only six Judges think James Voter is right, the view of
the minority of three Judges must prevail, and the Court must render its decision

113. WARREN, supra note 57, at 193.
114. Fabian Franklin, Five to Four in the Supreme Court, 110 INDEP. 246, 247 (1923). See
also, e.g., Cushman, supranote 24, at 801:
And so far as the influence on the popular mind is concerned, it may seriously be
questioned which is most calculated to inspire distrust of the Supreme Court, -a
decision invalidating a statute by a vote of five to four or a decision upholding a
statute rendered by a court of nine, eight of whom believe the statute to be null and
void.
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in favor of John Citizen.' 1 5

In the view of Warren and many others,
the fundamental objection to th[is] proposition was that it completely ignored the
true function of a judicial tribunal, which was, to hold the scales ofjustice even
and to decide impartially between the parties, the appellant and appellee both
meeting before it on even terms.... The parties no longer came into the Court on

an equal basis, but with the chances heavily weighted against [one party]-and this
was not inconsonance with any Anglo-Saxon system ofjustice." 6
This operation of the protocol seems particularly unfair in the event that the lower
federal or state court from which the appeal was taken had already (perhaps
unanimously) held for the federal constitutional claimant after finding the statute
unconstitutional, a conclusion then shared by six but not seven members of the
Supreme Court. If six Justices believed that the party relying on the Constitution as
against the statute should win, the argument concluded, then that party "deserved"
to
1 17
win and would be unfairly treated by a voting protocol that dictated otherwise.

115. WARREN, supra note 57, at 179-81.
116.2 CHARLES WARREN, THE SUPREME COURT INUNITED STATES HISTORY 125-26 (1922)
(speaking of the objection in reference to supermajority proposals introduced in Congress in
1824).

117. Of course, this argument again fails to count the congressionalmajority that voted to
enact the statute in determining what constitutes the "majority" and "minority" positions for
purposes of dictating which litigant "deserves" to win. One could dress this concern in
constitutional clothing as well, focusing on the reformed structure of adjudication, rather than
fairness to litigants. If a supermajority rule is tied to a single issue raised by a case, such as a
constitutional challenge to a statute, then the Justices must adjudicate the case by first deciding
that issue under the supermajority protocol, and then considering any remaining issues under
simple majority rule. In other words, the Justices must first and separately vote on the
constitutional issue in order to see whether the Court as a corporate entity will uphold or
invalidate the statute, and then the Justices must take that collective decision as a given to direct
the rest of their decisionmaking process. If five-but only five-Justices think the statute is
unconstitutional, they must defer to the minority faction and then continue to decide the case as

if they believed the statute was constitutional. This ordered decisionmaking seems inconsistent
with the notion that courts decide cases rather than issues of law, and arguably therefore is
inconsistent with the notion that Article III courts issue judgments, not opinions. See generally
Edward A. Hartnett, A Matter of Judgment,Not a Matter of Opinion, 74 N.Y.U. L. REV. 123
(1999).

But while the protocol does require us to think differently about the process of adjudication, I
do not find this challenge fully persuasive. The Constitution clearly precludes federal courts
from issuing declarations of law when unnecessary to decide an Article III case or controversy.

But the supermajority protocol is merely a means of determining the law that will be applied to
an actual controversy, not a mechanism for lawmaking outside such a context. The fact that the
process of adjudication focuses, in part, on law declaration does not turn the pronouncement into
an advisory opinion, so long as the declaration of law in fact plays a role in determining which
litigant wins the judgment.

Moreover, there are (admittedly infrequent) cases in which an individual Justice has deferred
to her colleagues' views on one issue in a case, and uses their views as a basis for reaching and
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3. The Common Theme: Bifurcation of Legal Reasoning and Relevant Outcome
At the root of these complaints about minority control over the fate of statutes and
litigants is a common underlying concern: that salient legal outcomes should be
justified by the best statement of what the law is. The complaint about loss of public
respect is driven by the disjunction between the majority's statement ofthe law and the
legal outcome of judicial review (i.e., whether the statute is upheld or invalidated).
And the complaint about litigant unfairness is driven by the disjunction between the
majority's statement of the law and the legal disposition of the case (i.e., whether the
constitutional claimant wins or loses).
Digging deeper, it is clear that both complaints rest on the unsurprising notion that
the majority's legal reasoning, not the minority's reasoning, will be accepted by the
public as the better and more authoritative statement of what the law is. Obviously, if
the public perceived the minority-backed declaration of law as being authoritative,
then there would be no cognitive dissonance created by having that declaration govern
either the statutes' or the litigants' fortunes.
But by the Progressive Era, we had moved well past the earlier view that the
Constitution was some sort of fundamental law enforceable by courts only as a matter
of political morality, and had long embraced the view that the Constitution is
"ordinary" (albeit "supreme") law, and therefore is subject to conventional forms of
judicial interpretation.' 1 8 As such, Justices engaged in constitutional analysis were
viewed as striving for an "accurate" interpretation and, as with interpretation of
statutes and the common law, it was assumed that when Justices disagreed, the
majority view had greater claim to accuracy than the minority position. 1 9 Of course
this did not stop commentators from criticizing majoritarian positions in specific cases,
but in an abstract sense it was still assumed that judicial majorities were more often

deciding other issues in the case, even if that means she ends up voting inconsistently with the
way she would have decided the case on her own. One infamous example is Justice White's
opinion in Pennsylvania v. Union Gas, 491 U.S. 1 (1989) (White, J., concurring) (voting to
uphold statutory abrogation of state sovereign immunity despite own view that statute did not
purport to do so). See also Susanna Sherry, Justice O'Connor's Dilemma: The Baseline
Question, 39 WM. & MARY L. REv. 865, 882-92 (1998); but see Hartnett, supra, at 138-41
(noting that most instances of intracase deference were necessary to fashion majority agreement
on ajudgment). Ido not believe this intracase deference has ever been criticized as a violation of
Article II1,although it has been criticized as a matter of policy. See Hartnett, supra,at 142-46. In
addition, in one sense, the Supreme Court routinely decides only issues within a case, instead of
the entire case itself, when it grants a petition of certiorari limited to certain specified legal
issues. The Court does itself pronounce ajudgment, but in a temporal sense it is simply deciding
some of the issues embedded in a larger adjudication. It does not seem that different for the
Justices to decide two or more issues in a single case, treating them serially as independent
issues governed by a protocol rule. It would simply be more efficient than, say, granting
certiorari on the constitutional question, upholding the statute and remanding for further
proceedings, and then granting certiorari again on the statutory application question.
118. See SNowIss, supra note 18, at 3-4, 119, 172-75.
119. For a representative Progressive Era claim to this effect, see Joseph D. Sullivan,
Curbing the Supreme Court, 11 GEO. L.J. 10, 14 (1923) ("The minority opinion represents not
what the law is but what some learned men think it should be. The majority decision is the
law."). See Caminker, supra note 97, at 2362-63 (supporting this proposition analytically).
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right than minorities. And thus, it would seem to follow, the resolution of an issue and
the overall outcome of a case should be dictated by majority rather than minority
reasoning. If six Justices explained why they believed a statute was unconstitutional

and therefore the petitioner should win, and only three Justices expressed a contrary
view, Borah's protocol would drive a wedge between the more likely accurate
the outcomes of upholding the statute and entering judgment
reasoning of the six, and
120
against the petitioner.
This bifurcation of(majority-backed) reasoning and results seemed to challenge the
rule of law. As one contemporary put it:
The justices of the Supreme Court of the United States are experts in the art of
construing and applying the basic law adopted by our forefathers a century and a
half ago. If five of the nine justices unite in finding that the justice of the
Constitution shelters and protects a citizen,.., what respect would that instrument
are to be enforced only in case seven out of nine judges are
inspire if its precepts
121
in favor thereof?
Of course, this rhetorical question would lose some of its bite if a supermajority
protocol were premised on the propositions that (1) Congress's enactment of a statute
reflects its judgment that the statute is constitutional, and (2) Congress's judgment

counts as meaningful evidence supporting the accuracy of its constitutional

120. To the extent the Justices would still be applying a clear-mistake standard in their own
atomistic determinations, then the six-person majority would really be saying that the statute was
unconstitutional beyond reasonable doubt, creating an even larger rift between the majority's
reasoning and the corporate decision.
121. Ira Jewell Williams, The Attack upon the Supreme Court, 7 CONST. REV. 143, 146-47
(1923); see also WARREN, supranote 57, at 203 ("No class or section of the people of the United
States would ever accept or have confidence in a judicial decision which fixed their rights and
duties, by the views of a minority of the Court-of three Judges out of nine.").
The same concern, I believe, explains the discomfort many feel about the rare "paradoxical"
case in which the Court resolves two legal questions, and yet, because of the particular lineup of
Justices on each question, the Court issues ajudgment seemingly at odds with its own collective
reasoning. The most well-known paradoxical case is National Mutual Insurance Co. v.
Tidewater Transfer Co., 337 U.S. 582 (1949), in which the Court upheld on a 5-4 vote the
constitutionality of the federal diversity jurisdiction statute as applied to a suit between a
Maryland and a District of Columbia citizen. Two Justices ruled that the District counted as a
state, and seven rejected this argument; three Justices ruled that Congress could expand Article
III jurisdiction in this manner, and six rejected this argument. But the two and the three were
different groups, and thus there were five votes to uphold the statute, despite the fact that
supermajorities rejected both supportive theories. Many able scholars have addressed this type of
voting "paradox," some supporting the outcome-voting approach in Tidewater and others
advocating an issue-by-issue approach. See, e.g., MAXWELL L. STEARNS, CONSTITUTIONAL
PROCESS 111-24, 340 n.2 (2000) (citing other scholarship on point).
But whatever view one takes, it is clear that the controversy is driven by the discomfort that
arises when, as in Tidewater, the Court issues a judgment that appears to conflict with the
majority-backed legal reasoning offered in its support. See, e.g., Bruce Chapman, Rational
Aggregation, 1POL., PHIL. & ECON. 337, 341-45 (2002) (discussing the obligation of "public
reasons" supporting a judicial decision); Hartnett, supra note 117, at 134-42 (noting other
"paradoxical" cases).
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interpretation.' 22 Suppose one considers Congress's implicit judgment to deserve the
same weight in assessing the accuracy of a proffered interpretation as the vote of a
single Justice. Then the statute comes to the Court with one "vote" already cast in its
favor, and it would take a vote of six, rather than five, Justices against the statutesupporting constitutional interpretation to form a majority ofthe Court-plus-Congress
(six out of ten) sharing a presumptively accurate interpretation rendering the statute
unconstitutional. 23 The point is that one could view a supermajority protocol as
designed to increase the likelihood of identifying an "accurate" constitutional
interpretation, by viewing Congress's input as valuable to making such a
24
determination. 1

Suffice it for now to say that neither Borah and his supporters, nor his critics,
viewed the supermajority proposal as reflecting this vision. Rather, both sides viewed
the supermajority protocol as being designed to introduce and give some weight in the
judicial review process to a factor other than pure "accuracy" of legal interpretation.
Borah was primarily concerned that the people's instinctive valuation of democratic

122. See supra text accompanying notes 43-44 (justifications (1) and (2) for Thayerian
deference). There is a substantial literature debating the validity of each of these propositions.
See generally Garrett & Vermeule, supra note 38 (discussing institutional reforms that might
make these propositions more true for Congress).
123. Of course, tojustify Senator Borah's proposed consensus requirement of seven Justices
to invalidate a statute, one would have to view Congress's judgment as deserving the equivalent
weight of three Justices' votes-such that a 7-2 judicial vote would really represent a 7-5
majority Court-plus-Congress vote, whereas a 6-3 judicial vote would really represent a 6-6
Court-plus-Congress vote.
124. Mitch Berman suggested to me that one could similarly view the President as exercising
a "vote" through his sign-or-veto decision. One might say that a presidential signing should
count as a vote in favor of the accuracy of a constitutional interpretation supporting the statute,
and a veto should count in favor of the accuracy of a constitutional interpretation challenging the
statute. This view could justify the following protocol: when the President signs a statute into
law, the Court may declare it unconstitutional only with at least six Justices' votes (representing
a 6-5 majority Court-plus-Congress-plus-President vote); but when the statute is enacted over the
President's veto, the Court may declare it unconstitutional with five Justices' votes (still
representing a 6-5 majority Court-plus-Congress-plus-President vote). Of course, one would
have to ignore or somehow deal with the obvious complication that signing and vetoing
statements reveal that presidents occasionally sign bills they believe contain unconstitutional
provisions and they occasionally veto bills with which they have no constitutional complaint.
For an intriguing combination judicial-review-preclusion and legislative override proposal
(rather than a straightforward supermajority proposal) that viewed presidential signature as a
salient act along these lines, see the proposal of Representative Morin, providing in relevant part:
The Supreme Court of the United States shall have no power to set aside as
unconstitutional any Act of Congress adopted in pursuance of this article, or any
other Act of Congress which shall have received the signature of the President;
and, in case any Act which shall have been passed over the President's veto by a
two-thirds majority of each House of Congress shall be declared unconstitutional
by the said court, it shall again be voted upon, and if it shall again receive twothirds of the votes of each of said Houses it shall be the law, notwithstanding the
decision of the said court.
H.R.J. REs. 361, 64th Cong. (1917).
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decisionmaking would lead them to disrespect judicial rulings that were
"countermajoritarian" in the Bickelian sense but were supported by only a baremajority judicial vote. Other supermajority supporters emphasized Thayer's concern
about the debilitation of democratic/populist constitutional reasoning and worried that
aggressive judicial review would lead to the atrophy of these alternative, and in the
long run, necessary, venues for dialogue about constitutional values.
In the arguments sketched above, 125 Borah's critics recognized that a supermajority
protocol premised on either of these arguments-and the same would apply to any
other argument for deference derived from the political consequences of judicial
invalidation of federal statutes-would lay bare the Court's effort to serve two masters
at once: (1) to provide a principled interpretation of the Constitution, with the majority
view being accepted as "accurate," and (2) to take account of the political
consequences of judicial review. At a minimum, the blatant divergence of legal
outcomes from legal reasoning would diminish the Court's claim to be a forum of
principle, as opposed to being (in part) a politically sensitive actor mindful of the
institutional consequences of its actions. 126 And this was thought by the Borah
opponents to be sufficient reason to oppose the adoption of supermajority rules.
4. Application of Theme to Atomistic Enforcement of Thayerian Deference
By repeating the complaints that "minority rule" would drive a wedge between
accurate legal reasoning and legal results (for statutes or litigants), I do not mean to
endorse them uncritically. Borah's explanation of the dichotomy-that the protocol
was designed to enforce deference to Congress, as a separable objective of judicial
review-would have been graspable by the public. And people can always learn to
expect different things from adjudication. In today's Nebraska and North Dakota, for
example, one does not find a groundswell of fervent opposition to their supermajority
rules; apparently the inhabitants of these states have grown comfortable with the
notion that their supreme courts occasionally issue rulings dictating the fates of statutes
and litigants that are inconsistent with the legal reasoning contained in the
presumptively "accurate" majority-backed opinions.
But even taking these concerns about corrupting the "purity" of judicial
interpretation seriously, it is important to acknowledge-as Borah's opponents did
not-that the very same tension between reasoning and results also inheres in the
traditional clear-mistake rule as well, and any modem-day remnant thereof couched in
terms of a presumption of constitutionality. The only difference is that the tension is
mediated silently in the minds of individual Justices, not advertised publicly by the
externally visible voting protocol.
A Justice adhering to the Thayerian clear-error rule must, on the one hand,

125. See supra notes 109-126 and accompanying text.
126. Out of an abundance of caution, let me be absolutely clear that by "politically sensitive,"
I do not mean to describe Justices as being sensitive to partisanor ideologicalinfluences within
themselves, or responsive to such influences within Congress. I merely mean to describe
(presumably nonpartisan) Justices as being sensitive to the fact that the judicial invalidation of
federal statutes entails both expressive and tangible consequences for the workings of our
governmental system in relation to underlying norms, such as democratic accountability and
self-governance. In other words, judicial deference is driven by statescraft.

2003]

THA YERIAN DEFERENCEAND SUPERMAJORITY RULE

113

determine what she views as the best interpretation of the relevant constitutional
provision or principle (taking into account whatever universal and other role-specific
norms she finds appropriate), and, on the other hand, recognize the "statescraft" or
interdepartmental comity-related justifications for deference. On the subjective account
of the Thayerian standard, she contemplates how certain she is of her best judgment
that a federal statute is constitutional, and at some threshold level of uncertainty, she
uses the deference norm as a reason to uphold the statute. On the objective account of
the standard, the Justice asks not whether she believes the statute is unconstitutional,
but whether a reasonable Justice could find it constitutional, and if the latter is true, she
then invokes the Thayerian standard as a reason to do so herself. Either way, the
statescraft or political comity component ofjudicial review does a fair amount of the
work, competing with and, at times, trumping the "pure" interpretive project.
Atomistic enforcement of the deference norm thus also drives a wedge between
legal reasoning and outcome, both for the statute and the litigants. With respect to the
statute, it would be upheld notwithstanding a majority or even unanimous view that it
was unconstitutional, so long as enough members of the coalition had some (subjective
or objective) doubt about the matter. And with respect to the litigants, a party
challenging the constitutionality of the statute could still lose, even after persuading a
majority or even every member of the Court of his position, so long as enough Justices
still harbored some doubt.
Moreover, those who criticized supermajority protocols for laying bare the political
aspect ofjudicial review knew full well that the atomistic enforcement they defended
raised the very same concern. Thayer himself did not hide the fact that Justices
following his prescription were not engaged in a project of providing the best
interpretation of the Constitution; in his own words, "the ultimatequestion is not what
127
is the true meaningof the constitution,but whetherlegislation is sustainableor not."
As he put it differently, a judge applying the clear-mistake standard needed "that
combination of a lawyer's rigor with a statesman's breadth of view. ' 28 And as another
commentator noted during the Progressive Era:
If [judges] do not decide for themselves as a judicial question whether the two
documents [statute and Constitution] conflict but try instead to determine whether
reasonable men could have harmonized them, then it would seem that they have
failed to exercise the essential duty of declaring what the court finds the law to be,
and have instead declared what some one' else might reasonably have found it to
be.... Thus it would appear that it is only on the theory that in passing upon the
validity of statutes the courts are exercising a power essentially political in origin
129
and nature that Thayer's doctrine can be logically supported.
More recently, some scholars have phrased the critique in even more radical terms.
Professor Sylvia Snowiss claims that applying Thayer's clear-mistake standard in a
modem world, where the Constitution is viewed as a supreme form of ordinary law, is
actually "incoherent," apparently because it undermines the view that constitutional

127. Thayer, supra note 25, at 150 (emphasis in original).
128. Id. at 138.
129. Cushman, supra note 24, at 788-89.
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adjudication is an act of interpretation. 30 Professor Gary Lawson claims that
Thayerian deference cannot be squared with Marbury's notion that the judicial
function is to "say what the law is,"' 31 with the result that such judicial deference to
is not just improper or incoherent, but downright
congressional determinations
32
unconstitutional.

In my view, Snowiss and Lawson push the claim of tension between interpretation
and deference too far; they both have a rather rigid view of what the project of
constitutional interpretation must be once the Constitution is recognized to be a form
of ordinary (if supreme) law. And let us not forget that many state courts still purport
to operate under the tum-of-the-(prior)-century clear-mistake standard even in the
modem era. 33 But it is sufficient for present purposes to recognize the central point:
that Thayer's clear-mistake standard of review, and its modem-day shadow
"presumption of constitutionality," both share the central defect trumpeted by Borah's
opponents-they require Justices to operationalize a sensitivity to the political aspect
ofjudicial review that drives a wedge between "pure" legal reasoning and adjudicatory
outcomes. And Borah's detractors knew it.
Now, there still are reasons someone might prefer one or the other way of importing
deference into judicial review. Borah's opponents were surely right to worry that the
supermajority protocol throws the potential conflict between accuracy and political

130. See SNOWISS, supra note 18, at 172:
Both the doubtful case rule for determinations of unconstitutionality and the 'not
unconstitutional' standard for sustaining legislation tapped ineradicable differences
in kind that originally and clearly separated fundamental law from ordinary
law.... Thus, neither the doubtful case rule nor the 'not unconstitutional' standard
is coherent or intemally consistent for modem judicial review.
131. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803).
132. See, e.g., Gary Lawson, Thayer Versus Marshall, 88 Nw. U. L. REV. 221 (1993); see
also Gary Lawson & Christopher D. Moore, The Executive Power of Constitutional
Interpretation,81 IOWA L. REV. 1267, 1274-79 (1996) (rejecting Thayerian deference toward

federal statutes on the ground that "on balance we regard the arguments for formal judicial
interpretative independence to be stronger than the arguments for a Thayerian interpretative
posture").
For the same reason, Lawson has argued, judicial deference to prior judicial decisions
through the role-specific norm of stare decisis is affirmatively unconstitutional. Gary Lawson,
Controlling Precedent: CongressionalRegulation of Judicial Decision-Making, 18 CONST.
COMMENT. 191, 194 (2001) ("It is affirmatively unconstitutional for federal courts to rely on
precedent in constitutional cases."). See also Gary Lawson, The ConstitutionalCase Against
Precedent,17 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 23 (1994) (developing argument). His reasoning would
lead him, I believe, to conclude the same about intracase deference to a colleague's judgment. I
think these role-specific norms can be distinguished from Thayerian deference, however,
because at least the norms of stare decisis and collegiality involve deference from one Article III
actor to another, and can both be defended as means of constructing a single best interpretation

of a constitutional provision or principle from the perspective of the Article Il judiciary writ
large. See Evan H. Caminker, Why Must Inferior Courts Obey Superior CourtPrecedents?,46
STAN. L. REV. 817, 857-58 (1994) (explaining judiciary-centric rather than court-centric
perspective on legal interpretation).
133. See Robert A. Schapiro, JudicialDeference andInterpretive Coordinacy in State and
FederalConstitutionalLaw, 85 CORNELL L. REV. 656, 690-91 (2000).
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deference in the public's face. It is one thing to lose a case after being told by the
majority that your argument was not quite convincing enough; it feels like a very
different thing to lose despite being told by the majority that they agree with your legal
claim.
On the other hand, I can imagine an argument in favor of candor here. If a
supermajority protocol replaced (rather than supplemented) an atomistic enforcement
regime, then at least individual Justices could focus exclusively on determining the
best interpretation of the Constitution, without trying to be statespersons at the same
time. As Lawson might say, the judicial role could be purified, with Justices simply
being the best law-declarers they can be, while letting the chips fall where the
supermajority protocol places them. Put differently, the work being done by the two
objectives of accuracy and deference are rendered more transparent when the latter is
secured by a supermajority protocol rather than atomistic Thayerian deference.
The state systems show that neither approach is crazy: many choose the atomistic
approach, a couple choose the protocol approach, and at least Nebraska chooses both
at once. For someone committed to the norm of Thayerian deference, the question is
how, not whether, to manage the inevitable tension between the legal and political
impulses underlying judicial review.
V.

BACK TO THE MODERN COURT

This last discussion might explain why the modem Court seems no longer
committed to the Thayerian norm or anything approaching it-why the boilerplate
"presumption of constitutionality" has apparently become a meaningless mantra. The
best way to assuage the tension, at least on the visible surface, is simply to forgo the
concerns about political consequences and apply judicial doctrines without flinching
when they point to statutory invalidity.
I say "on the visible surface" because the modem Court uses yet a third device for
mediating the tension: building deference into the very structure of constitutional
doctrine. As explained earlier, some constitutional doctrines call for outright judicial
abstention, and many others call for highly deferential "rationality review."'1 34 These
doctrines generally do not treat federal statutes in any specially deferential way, and
thus are not true to the Thayerian vision. But they do encompass deference to federal
statutes, and in that sense they get the job done.
To be sure, Justices must think about the political consequences ofjudicial review
when fashioning the doctrines in the first place, for example, when deciding whether or
not to limit Congress to regulating "commercial activities" using its Commerce Clause
authority. But at least once the doctrine is set, the Justices can apply it on a case-bycase basis without appearing to appeal to any guides other than the doctrine itself. Of
the three mechanisms for incorporating Thayerian deference considered here, perhaps
the Court's current approach, mouthing but not meaning the words of deference and
just straightforwardly applying rules with the deference already built in, best masks the
political component ofjudicial review. Given a Court seemingly bent on maintaining
an aura ofjudicial supremacy, presupposing that it is uniquely competent to pronounce
authoritative interpretations of the Constitution, this is an unsurprising choice.

134. Id. at 683-86, 689-90.
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But for those who would prefer turning back to a more "minimal model ofjudicial
review," 35 either for certain constitutional claims or perhaps even across the board, the
choice is not an inevitable one.

iIi

I

135. Kramer, supra note 5, at 166.

III

III

II I
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APPENDIX

This Appendix reports the form, coverage, and minimum required consensus for the
listed supermajority proposals. Despite intensive research efforts, due to both
recording and indexing limitations this list may not include every original
supermajority proposal ever introduced in Congress; and this list does not include
every amendment offered to original proposals).
Proposal 136 and
Sponsor
41 ANNALS OF CONG.
28, 18th Cong., 1st
Sess. 1823

Form'of
Proposal' 37
resolution asking
Committee on
Judiciary to devise

(Sen. Johnson)

legislation

42 ANNALS OF CONG.
336, 18th Cong., I st
Sess. 1824

Coverage 3 a

Minimum Required
139

Consensus

federal or state
laws

7 (of 7)

legislation

state law

5 (of 7);
seriatim opinions
required

legislation

state constitution
or statute

5 (of 7);
seriatim opinions
required

legislation

state constitution
or statute

2/3, of entire Court;
equals 5 (of 7)

legislation

state constitution
or statute

5 (of 7);
seriatim opinions
required

legislation

federal statute or
treaty, state
constitution or

6 (of 10);
presupposing Court
expansion

(Sen. Van Buren)

42 ANNALS OF CONG,
2514, 18th Cong., 1st
Sess. 1824
(Rep. Lechter)

42 ANNALS OF CONG.
2635, 18th Cong., Ist
Sess. 1824
(Rep. Metcalfe)

42 ANNALS OF CONG.
365, 18th Cong., 2d
Sess. 1825
(Rep. Lechter)

2 REG. DEB. 1124,
19th Cong., 1st Sess.
1825
(Rep. Wickliffe)

statute

136. Most of these proposals are original bills or resolutions, but a couple are amendments to
bills previously introduced.
137. The three forms represented are legislation, constitutional amendments, and referrals to
the Committee on the Judiciary to produce legislation.
138. Unless otherwise specified, the supermajority requirement applies only to federal
constitutional challenges to the types of law listed here.
139. Where the required consensus is expressed as a fraction rather than a specific number of
Justices, the denominator sometimes refers to the total number of Justices actually participating
in the decision, and other times refers to the total number of Justices on the Court even if one or
more is not participating. I use the notation "ambiguous denominator" where it is unclear if the
prescribed percentage must be of the entire Court's members or only those participating in a
given decision.
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Form of
Proposal137

Coverage 138

legislation

state constitution

Consensus139
7 (of 10);

or statute

presupposing Court

19th Cong., I st Sess.

1826

Minimum Required

expansion

(Sen. Rowan)

3 REG. DEB. 775,
19th Cong., 2d Sess.
1827

legislation

state law

5 (of 7); seriatim
opinions required

legislation

state constitution
or statute

greater than majority;
equals 5 (of 7)

legislation

federal statute or
authority

unanimous,
of entire
Court 40

legislation

federal statute or
authority

unanimous,
of entire
Court' 41

legislation

federal law

2/3, of entire Court

legislation

federal statute or
authority

unanimous,
of entire
Court 43

legislation

federal statute

2/3, of ambiguous
denominator

legislation

federal statute

unanimous, of
ambiguous

legislation

federal law, state
law, or state
constitution
federal or state
statute

(Rep. Wickliffe)

H.R. 353, 20th Cong.,
2d Sess. 1828
(Rep. Barbour)

H.R. 1015, 39th
Cong., 2d Sess. 1867
(Rep. Benjamin)

H.R. 30, 40th Cong.,
1st Sess. 1867
(Rep. Williams)

Amendment to S.
163, 40th Cong., 2d
Sess. 1868

42

(Sen. Wilson)

Amendment to S.
163, 40th Cong., 2d
Sess. 1868
(Sen. Williams)

H.R. 379, 40th Cong.,
2d Sess. 1868
(Rep. Miller)

S. 3179, 54th Cong.,
1st Sess. 1896
(Sen. Allen)

S. 3222, 62nd Cong.,
Ist Sess. 1911
(Sen. Boume)
S.J. Res. 6, 63rd
Cong., 1st Sess. 1913

denominator

constitutional
amendment

unanimous, of entire
Court;
equals 9 (of 9)
2/3, of entire Court;
equals 6 (of 9)

(Sen. Reed)

140. At this time, Congress had recently reduced the number of Supreme Court Justice
positions from ten to seven. See Act of July 23, 1866, ch. 210, 14 Stat. 209. But Article III's life
tenure guarantee meant that the Court would actually shrink from ten to seven Justices only with
the passage of time due to death or resignation. So when this unanimity proposal was introduced,
the absolute size of the required consensus was contingent. The number of Justices did in fact
fall to eight by April 1869, when Congress increased the size of the Court back up to nine
Justices. See Act of April 10, 1869, ch. 22, 16 Stat. 44.
141. See supranote 140.
142. See supranote 140.
143. See supranote 140.
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Proposal 36 and
Sponsor
H.R.J. Res. 39, 65th
Cong., 1st Sess. 1917
(Rep. Hayden)

Form of
Proposal137
constitutional
amendment

H.R. 12415, 65th
Cong., 2d Sess. 1918
(Rep. Dillon)

legislation

H.R.J. Res. 16, 66th
Cong., 1st Sess. 1919
(Rep. Hayden)

constitutional
amendment

H.R.J. Res. 15, 67th
Cong., 1st Sess. 1921
(Rep. Hayden)

constitutional
amendment

H.R. 9755, 67th
Cong., 2d Sess. 1922

legislation

federal or state
statute

7 (of 9)

legislation

federal statute

7 (of 9)

legislation

federal statute

7 (of 9)

H.R.J. Res. 436, 67th
Cong., 4th Sess. 1923
(Rep. Frear)

legislation

federal statute

grants Congress
power to determine
number of Justices

S. 1197, 68th Cong.,
1st Sess. 1923

legislation

federal or state
statute

7 (of 9)

legislation

federal statute

7 (of 9)

legislation

federal or state
statute

7 (of 9)

legislation

federal statute

7 (of 9)

legislation

federal statute

unanimous, of
ambiguous

Coverage
_

coverage
ambiguous: "no
law shall be held

Minimum Required
Consensus 139
all but two Justices, of
ambiguous
denominator

unconstitutional"
coverage
ambiguous: "no
law or
congressional act"
coverage
ambiguous: "no
law shall be held

3/4, of participating
Justices
all but two Justices, of
ambiguous
denominator

unconstitutional"

coverage
ambiguous: "no
law shall be held

all but two Justices, of
ambiguous
denominator

unconstitutional"

(Rep. McSwain)

S. 4483, 67th Cong.,
4th Sess. 1923
(Sen. Borah)

H.R. 14209, 67th
Cong., 4th Sess. 1923
(Rep. Woodruff)

required

(Sen. Borah)

H.R. 697, 68th Cong.,
1st Sess. 1923
(Rep. Woodruff)

H.R. 721, 68th Cong.,
1st Sess. 1923
(Rep. LaGuardia)

H.R. 6762, 69th
Cong., 1st Sess. 1926
(Rep. Woodruff)

S.J. Res. 162, 71st
Cong., 2d Sess. 1930

denominator

(Sen. Brookhart)

H.R.J. Res. 277, 74th
Cong., 1st Sess. 1935
(Rep. Ramsay)

constitutional.
amendment
(specifying
ratification by state
convention)

federal statute

3/4, of entire Court;
equals 7 (of 9)

INDIANA LA WJOURNAL
Proposal 136 and
Sponsor
H.R. 7997, 74th
Cong., 1st Sess. 1935
(Rep. Ramsay)
H.R. 8054, 74th
Cong., 1st Sess. 1935
(Rep. Ramsay)
H.R. 8100, 74th
Cong., 1st Sess. 1935
(Rep. Crosser)
H.R. 8123, 74th
Cong., 1st Sess. 1935
(Rep. Young)
H.R. 8168, 74th
Cong., 1st Sess. 1935
(Rep. Monaghan)
H.R.J. Res., 287, 74th
Cong., 1st Sess. 1935
(Rep. Dobbins)
S.J. Res. 149, 74th
Cong., 1st Sess. 1936
(Sen. Norris)
S. 3739, 74th Cong.,
2d Sess. 1936
(Sen. Norbeck)
S. 3912, 74th Cong.,
2d Sess. 1936
(Sen. Pope)
H.R. 10196, 74th
Cong., 2d Sess. 1936
(Rep. Gillette)
S. 437, 75th Cong.,
Ist Sess. 1937
(Sen. Pope)
S. 1098, 75th Cong.,
1st Sess. 1937
(Sen. Gillette)
S.J. Res. 98, 75th
Cong., 1st Sess. 1937
(Sen. O'Mahoney)

S.J. Res. 100, 75th
Cong., 1st Sess. 1937
(Sen. Andrews)

38
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Form of
Proposal 37
legislation

Coverage

federal or state
statute

7 (of9)

legislation

federal or state
statute

7 (of 9)

legislation

federal or state
statute

3/4, of ambiguous
denominator

legislation

federal or state
statute

3/4, of ambiguous
denominator

legislation

federal or state
statute

constitutional
amendment

exercise of
congressional
power
federal statute

unanimous, of
ambiguous
denominator
2/3, of ambiguous
denominator

constitutional
amendment

Minimum Required
Consensus 139

2/3, of ambiguous
denominator

legislation

federal statute

7 (of 9)

legislation

federal statute

greater than 2/3, of
participating Justices

legislation

federal statute

7 (of 9)

legislation

federal statute

Greater than 2/3, of
participating Justices

legislation

federal statute

constitutional
amendment

federal or state
law

constitutional
amendment

federal statute

7 (of 9);
no consideration of
precedent
2/3, of ambiguous
denominator;
seriatim opinions
required;
each Justice must find
law unconstitutional
"beyond a reasonable
doubt"
2/3, of entire Court;
equals 7 (of 11, based
on proposed Court
expansion)

2003]

THA YERIAN DEFERENCEAND SUPERMAJORITY RULE

121

Coverage 138

Minimum Required
39
Consensus'

state statute;
claimed
repugnancy to
Federal
Constitution,
treaty, or law
state constitution
or statute;
claimed
repugnancy to
Federal
Constitution,
treaty, or law
state constitution
or statute;
claimed
repugnancy to
Federal
Constitution,
treaty, or law
federal statute, or
state constitution
or statute

unanimous, of
participating Justices

constitutional
amendment

federal or state
statute

2/3, of ambiguous
denominator

constitutional
amendment

federal or state
statute

2/3, of ambiguous
denominator

constitutional
amendment

federal or state
statute

2/3, of ambiguous
denominator

constitutional
amendment

any decision
involving
interpretation of
federal or state

2/3, of ambiguous
denominator

Proposal 136 and
Sponsor
H.R. 13857, 85th
Cong., 2d Sess. 1958
(Rep. Abbitt)

Form of
137
Proposal
legislation

H.R. 4565, 86th
Cong., 1st Sess. 1959
(Rep. Abbitt)

legislation

H.R. 4659, 86th
Cong., 1st Sess. 1959
(Rep. Tuck)

legislation

H.R. 11007, 90th
Cong., 1st Sess. 1967
(Rep. Erlenborn)

legislation

H.R.J. Res. 1149,
90th Cong., 2d Sess.
1968
(Rep. Rogers)
H.R.J. Res. 1172,
90th Cong., 2d Sess.
1968
(Rep. Pool)
H.R.J. Res. 1369,
90th Cong., 2d Sess.
1968
(Rep. Teague)
H.R.J. Res. 1469,
90th Cong., 2d Sess.
1968
(Rep. Betts)
H.R.J. Res. 94, 91st
Cong., Ist Sess. 1969
(Rep. Teague)
H.R.J. Res. 193, 91 st
Cong., 1st Sess. 1969
(Rep. Cabell)
H.R.J. Res. 557, 91st
Cong., Ist Sess. 1969
(Rep. Nichols)
H.R.J. Res. 700, 91st
Cong., 1st Sess. 1969
(Rep. Devine)

constitutional
amendment

federal or state
statute

2/3, of ambiguous
denominator

constitutional
amendment

federal statute, or
state constitution
or statute
federal or state
statute

2/3, of entire Court;
equals 6 (of 9)

federal statute, or
state constitution
or statute

2/3, of entire Court;
equals 6 (of 9)

unanimous, of
participating Justices

unanimous, of
participating Justices

6 (of 9)

constitution

constitutional
amendment
constitutional
amendment

2/3, of ambiguous
denominator

INDIA NA LA W JOURNAL
Proposal 136 and
Sponsor
H.R.J. Res. 758, 91st
Cong., 1st Sess. 1969
(Rep. King)
H.R.J. Res. 293, 92d
Cong., 1st Sess. 1971
(Rep. Teague)
H.R.J. Res. 323, 93d
Cong., Ist Sess. 1973
(Rep. Teague)
H.R.J. Res. 84, 94th
Cong., 1st Sess. 1975
(Rep. Teague)
H.R. 4109, 96th
Cong., 1st Sess. 1979
(Rep. Doman)

Form of
137
Proposal
constitutional
amendment

H.R. 5182, 97th
Cong., 1st Sess. 1981
(Rep. Doman)

legislation
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Coverage 138

Minimum Required
139
Consensus
2/3, of entire Court;
equals 6 (of 9)

constitutional
amendment

federal statute, or
state constitution
or statute
federal or state
statute

constitutional
amendment

federal or state
statute

2/3, of ambiguous
denominator

constitutional
amendment

federal or state
statute

2/3, of ambiguous
denominator

legislation

federal or state
law;
applies only to
Supreme Court's
appellate
jurisdiction
federal or state
law;
applies only to
Supreme Court's
appellate
jurisdiction

7 (ofg)144

2/3, of ambiguous
denominator

7 (of 9)145

144. Interestingly, these proposals did not specify that the Court could not invalidate a
federal or state law absent consensus by the prescribed seven-Justice supermajority. Rather, the
proposal specified that any federal or state law "which is declaredinvalid under the Constitution
...shall not be invalid" absent the prescribed consensus. H.R. 4109, 96th Cong. (1979); H.R.
5182, 97th Cong. (1981) (emphasis added). Whatever that means ....
145. See supra note 144.

